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PREDISPUTE ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS IN
SECURITIES DISPUTES: RODRIGUEZ DE QUIJAS
V. SHEARSON/AMERICAN EXPRESS, INC.-
SPEEDY JUSTICE OR JUST SPEED?
I. INTRODUCTION
At the beginning of a relationship between a stockbroker' and a new
customer, the broker typically obtains an agreement that any future dis-
putes between the parties shall be subject to binding arbitration.2 The
agreement waives the customer's opportunity for court adjudication and
trial by jury.3 The issue in this Note is whether such predispute arbitra-
tion agreements4 between stockbrokers and public customers5 are
1. The terms "broker" and "stockbroker" will be used as a convenient shorthand in this
Note, referring to both the broker as an individual and the brokerage house employing the
broker.
2. A typical agreement requires arbitration of disputes and specifies how the arbitration
will be conducted (usually by specifying an organization to conduct the arbitration). RESOLV-
ING SEcuRmEs DIsPuTES 22 (Practising Law Institute, Corporate Law and Practice Course
Handbook No. 535, 1986). The customer may be offered a choice of forum between organiza-
tions offering to conduct arbitrations, known as self-regulatory organizations (SROs). Id. at
27. SROs are most often owned or controlled by the securities industry; the busiest SROs are
the New York Stock Exchange, Inc., and the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.,
which currently handle about 90% of the arbitrations nationwide. Metropolitan News-Enter-
prise (Los Angeles), Jan. 24, 1990, at 11, col. 1. A typical clause provides:
Unless unenforceable due to federal or state law, any controversy arising out of or
relating to my accounts, the transactions with you for me, or to this agreement or the
breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the rules then in
effect of the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., and/or the Boards of
Directors of the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. and/or the American Stock Ex-
change, Inc., as I may elect. If I do not make such election by registered mail ad-
dressed to you at your main office within five (5) days after demand by you that I
make such election then you may make such election. Judgment upon any award
ordered by the arbitrators may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof.
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Lehman Bros., 845 F.2d 1296, 1297 n.2 (5th Cir. 1988), aff'd
sub nom. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, 109 S. Ct. 1917 (1989).
3. See Katsoris, The Securities Arbitrators' Nightmare, 14 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 3, 4
(1986).
4. This Note considers only predispute arbitration agreements. Agreements reached in
settlement of an existing dispute are uniformly upheld, but involve quite different principles
and equities. E.g., Gardner v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 433 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 978 (1971); Moran v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, 389 F.2d 242 (3d Cir.
1968). Therefore, post-dispute arbitration agreements are beyond the scope of this Note.
5. This Note does not discuss the arbitrability of disputes between brokers, who are more
likely to be in positions of relatively equal bargaining power. Such agreements are less contro-
versial, and are routinely enforced. E.g., Axelrod & Co. v. Kordich, Victor & Neufeld, 320 F.
Supp. 193 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 451 F.2d 838 (2d Cir. 1971). Moreover, arbitration is re-
quired in most inter-broker disputes because of securities exchange rules affecting members of
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enforceable.
The securities industry has argued from the earliest cases that arbi-
tration is a mere choice-of-forum issue, providing swift, economical and
fair resolution of broker-customer disputes.' Securities customers have
resisted arbitration, however, arguing a wide variety of procedural defi-
ciencies and substantive unfairness.7 The wealth of litigation on the issue
demonstrates that both sides of securities disputes consider enforceability
an important matter.
The traditional answer to the enforceability question arose from the
resolution of a perceived conflict among the Federal Arbitration Act'
(the FAA), the Securities Act of 19331 (the Securities Act) and the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 193410 (the Exchange Act). The FAA gener-
ally requires enforcement of predispute arbitration agreements on
motion;11 the Securities Act grants the right to judicial redress and de-
clares void agreements to waive any provision of the Securities Act.12
The issue in this Note arises from the potential conflict between the FAA
and the Securities Act in deciding the enforceability of an agreement to
arbitrate securities disputes, specifically whether a predispute arbitration
agreement between a securities customer and a broker is void as an agree-
ment waiving a provision of the Securities Act, i.e., the right to judicial
redress, or whether securities arbitration agreements are enforceable
under the FAA.
In Wilko v. Swan,1 3 the United States Supreme Court concluded
that predispute arbitration agreements could not be enforced as to securi-
ties disputes arising under the Securities Act.14 This "bright-line" reso-
lution of the arbitrability question has dulled recently with the creation
of numerous exceptions. 5 A recent United States Supreme Court case,
Rodriguez de Quias v. Shearson/American Express,16 finally abandoned
the Wilko rule and thus removed the legal barrier to enforcement of
the exchange. E.g., Constitution of the New York Stock Exchange, art. IX, § 1, reprinted in 2
N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH) 1501 (1986).
6. E.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 437-38 (1953).
7. Id. Customers have argued the forum is fundamentally biased in favor of the securities
industry. See infra notes 228-61 and accompanying text.
8. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1988).
9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1988).
10. Id §§ 78a-78kk.
11. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
12. 15 U.S.C. § 77n.
13. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
14. Id. at 438. For a discussion of Wilko, see infra notes 20-46 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 19-114 and accompanying text.
16. 109 S. Ct. 1917 (1989).
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predispute arbitration agreements in securities disputes.17
In allowing enforcement of arbitration agreements, the Court over-
turned a long line of well-entrenched precedent supporting the Wilko
rule." Just six years before Rodriguez de Quias, the Wilko rule ap-
peared so firmly established that the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (the SEC) announced to brokers that simply requesting such
agreements from customers would be deemed a deceptive practice which
could subject brokers to legal sanction.19
This Note reviews the historical background of predispute arbitra-
tion agreements between securities brokers and customers. It then fo-
cuses on the final step in the trend favoring arbitration, Rodriguez de
Quias, and lastly considers whether unrestricted arbitration as it now
exists is a wise form of dispute resolution of conflicts between a public
customer and a broker.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Wilko v. Swan: Securities Act Supersedes FAA, Rendering
Predispute Arbitration Agreements Unenforceable
In 1925, Congress reversed the common-law unenforceability of ar-
bitration agreements by adopting the FAA, providing for specific en-
forcement of such agreements. 20 Following the stock market crash of
1929, Congress expanded securities regulation and guaranteed rights to
judicial redress of disputes through the Securities Act.21 The interplay
between these statutes was unclear for quite some time, since neither stat-
ute referred to the other or explicitly stated which would prevail in the
face of a conflict between them.
1. The majority opinion
In 1953, the United States Supreme Court clarified the relationship
between the FAA and the Securities Act in Wilko v. Swan.22 The facts
involved a typical broker-customer dispute. The broker allegedly per-
suaded the customer to purchase stock by falsely representing that the
corporation had agreed to a buy-out that would quickly increase the
17. Id. at 1922 (overruling Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 477 (1953)).
18. See infra note 171-72 and accompanying text.
19. Exchange Act Release No. 20,397, 48 Fed. Reg. 53,404 (1983).
20. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1988).
21. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77a-77aa (1988)).
22. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
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price of its stock.23 Further, the broker allegedly failed to disclose that a
director of the corporation was selling his shares.24 The customer liqui-
dated the stock two weeks later at a loss, which he sought to recover
through litigation against the broker and others.25
The customer sued in United States district court under section
12(2) of the Securities Act.2 6 The defendant-broker moved to stay judi-
cial proceedings until the matter could be arbitrated under provisions of
margin agreements27 with the customer, pursuant to section 3 of the
FAA.28 After a divided panel of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals29
reversed the district court's denial of the motion to stay, the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari.30
The Supreme Court framed the issue as "whether an agreement to
arbitrate a future controversy is a 'condition, stipulation, or provision
binding any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any
provision' of the Securities Act., 31 In an opinion by Justice Reed, the
Supreme Court held that the anti-waiver provision of the Securities Act
3 2
voided stipulations purporting to waive any provision of the Securities
Act.33 The Court also noted the competing pro-arbitration policy estab-
lished by the FAA, characterizing the FAA as setting forth a general
rule that arbitration agreements should be enforced "if the parties are
willing to accept less certainty of legally correct adjustment.
34
23. Id. at 428-29.
24. Id
25. Id. at 429.
26. Id at 428; 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1988).
27. A margin agreement sets forth terms for what is essentially a loan transaction. L.
MCMILLAN, OPTIONS AS A STRATEGIC INvEsTmENT 460 (1980). The customer is permitted
to purchase stock by depositing less than the full purchase price, with the shortage loaned by
the broker. Id. The broker is given rights to sell the stock if the customer does not repay in
specified times or under specified conditions (especially where the price declines, so that the
stock value approaches the amount of the loan). Id. at 80. The deceptive nature of arbitration
agreements imposed on customers, as more fully discussed infra at notes 298-312 and accom-
panying text, is well illustrated by the placement of the arbitration clause in Wilko. It was not
in a separate document or somewhere that the customer might otherwise expect; instead, it
was hidden in a document apparently unrelated to dispute resolution. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 429-
30.
28. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 429; 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1988).
29. Wilko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 439, 445 (2d Cir. 1953).
30. Wilko v. Swan, 345 U.S. 969 (1953).
31. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 430 n.6 (quoting section 14 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77n (1953)).
32. 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1988). The section provides: "Any condition, stipulation, or provi-
sion binding any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision of this
subchapter or of the rules and regulations of the Commission shall be void." Id.
33. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 433-35.
34. Id. at 438.
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The Court based its reasoning on the language of the Securities Act
and the underlying intent of Congress. 5 The Securities Act included an
expansive enforcement provision granting concurrent jurisdiction in state
and federal courts.36 The choices of forum open to an aggrieved securi-
ties customer thus go beyond those usually available in business transac-
tions, an important right in the Court's view.37 The Court was disturbed
by the arbitration practice of making awards without judicial instruction
in the law, especially since the arbitrators' failure to follow the law gener-
ally could not be corrected by appellate review unless the failure ap-
peared clearly.3"
This and other safeguards of judicial proceedings which the Court
deemed important were absent in an arbitration context.3 9 Therefore,
the Court held "the intention of Congress concerning the sale of securi-
ties is better carried out by holding invalid such an agreement for arbitra-
tion ......
2. The dissent
Justice Frankfurter authored a brief dissent,41 arguing there was no
showing in the record that arbitration would provide unfair or incom-
plete relief. 2 Although unwilling to infer that arbitrators were less capa-
ble than judges, as the majority did, the dissent was willing to infer that
arbitration was "a speedier, more economical and more effective enforce-
35. Id.
36. Id. at 432-33. The grant of jurisdiction the Court relied on is found at 15 U.S.C.
§ 77v(a) (1988), which states:
The district courts of the United States... shall have jurisdiction... concurrent
with State and Territorial courts, of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to
enforce any liability or duty created by this subchapter. Any such suit or action may
be brought in the district wherein the defendant is found or is an inhabitant or trans-
acts business, or in the district where the sale took place, if the defendant participated
therein, and process in such cases may be served in any other district of which the
defendant is an inhabitant or wherever the defendant may be found. Judgments and
decrees so rendered shall be subject to review as provided in sections [1292-1293] and
[1254] of Title 28. No case arising under this subchapter and brought in any State
court of competent jurisdiction shall be removed to any court of the United
States ...."
Since this creates federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988), it is unnec-
essary for a customer to meet the amount in controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction,
and unnecessary that diversity exist. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988).
37. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 434-37.
38. Id. at 436; see also 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1988) (setting forth grounds for vacating arbitrator's
award).
39. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 435-38.
40. Id. at 438.
41. See id. at 439-40 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 439 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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ment of ights... than can be had by the tortuous course of litigation
.... "43 The dissent also cautioned, "These advantages should not be
assumed to be denied in controversies like that before us arising under
the Securities Act, in the absence of any showing that settlement by arbi-
tration would jeopardize the rights of the plaintiff."'
The dissent concluded by mentioning an issue not explicitly dis-
cussed by the majority, namely the voluntariness of the agreement to
arbitrate.45 The dissent assumed without analysis that if the customer
had no choice in whether to sign the arbitration agreement, the agree-
ment would be unenforceable. 46
B. Subsequent Developments Through Shearson/American Express v.
McMahon: Creating Exceptions to Wilko
1. Initial reaction to Wilko: expanding the rule against arbitration
Although Wilko v. Swan47 dealt only with complaints under the Se-
curities Act, lower courts widely assumed many other securities disputes
were not subject to compelled arbitration.4" This assumption expanded
the Wilko rule considerably, since securities cases typically included alle-
gations under the Exchange Act,49 state securities laws, common law
fraud, contract theories, and later, the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Or-
ganizations Act50 (RICO), none of which was at issue in Wilko. "
The courts, however, were not alone in viewing Wilko as settled law.
When Congress amended the Exchange Act in 1975 to give the SEC
43. Id. at 439-40 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 440 (Frankfurter, J:, dissenting).
45. Id (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
46. Id. (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
47. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
48. Many federal circuit courts of appeal following Wilko held that claims under the Ex-
change Act could not be forced into arbitration pursuant to a predispute arbitration agree-
ment. E.g., Belke v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 693 F.2d 1023 (11th Cir.
1982); Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017 (6th Cir. 1979); Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Moore, 590 F.2d 823 (10th Cir. 1978); Weissbuch v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 558 F.2d 831 (7th Cir. 1977); Allegaert v. Perot, 548
F.2d 432 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 910 (1977); Sibley v. Tandy Corp., 543 F.2d 540 (5th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 824 (1977); Ayres v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 538 F.2d 532 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 429 U.S. 1010 (1976); In re Revenue Property Litig.
Cases, 451 F.2d 310 (1st Cir. 1971). All these cases would be overruled on this point by the
later United States Supreme Court decision in Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, 482
U.S. 220 (1987), discussed infra at notes 104-28 and accompanying text.
49. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78u (1985).
50. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1985).
51. See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985); Hoblin, Broker/Dealer
Response to Customer Complaints in Arbitration, in RESOLVING SECURITES DISPUTES, supra
note 2, at 327-28.
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power to regulate securities arbitration, the conference report cited
Wilko with approval and announced an intent to leave that holding
intact.52
2. The retreat from Wilko begins: Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.
In 1974, the Supreme Court created the first sitbstantial exception to
the Wilko rule. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. 3 involved an American
manufacturer's purchase of several overseas businesses and their trade-
marks." Negotiations between the manufacturer and the seller of the
businesses took place in the United States, Great Britain and Germany;
the parties signed the purchase and sale contract in Austria; the deal
closed in Switzerland; and the businesses conveyed in the transaction
were located in Germany and Liechtenstein." Disputes between the par-
ties, however, were to be resolved by arbitration in France. 6
The Scherk Court distinguished Wilko, which clearly involved only
United States law, from an international transaction. Giving great defer-
ence to the parties' choice of venue before a specific forum in a specific
country, the Court held Wilko "inapposite" since a "parochial refusal by
the courts of one country to enforce an international arbitration agree-
ment would not only frustrate [the purposes for having the agreement],
but would invite unseemly and mutually destructive jockeying by the
parties to secure tactical litigation advantages."5 7 Moreover, the Court
viewed an arbitration agreement as merely "a specialized kind of forum-
selection clause that posits not only the situs of the suit but also the pro-
cedure to be used in resolving the dispute."5" The Court concluded that
predispute arbitration agreements in international transactions were en-
forceable under the FAA, even if the matter would have fallen under the
Wilko rule had it not been part of an international transaction. 9
52. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 229, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 321, 342, which stated in pertinent part:
It was the clear understanding of the conferees that this amendment did not change
existing law, as articulated in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), concerning the
effect of arbitration proceedings provisions in agreements entered into by persons
dealing with members and participants in self-regulatory organizations.
Id.
Moreover, the SEC used its new regulatory authority in support of Wilko initially, as
discussed infra at notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
53. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
54. Idl at 508.
55. Id at 508-09.
56. Id at 508.
57. Id. at 516-17.
58. Id. at 519 (footnote omitted).
59. Id. at 519-20.
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Although the Court created an exception to the Wilko rule, the
Scherk exception was narrowly defined and dealt with a unique prob-
lem.' Under Scherk, arbitration issues in international transactions
should not be decided under the Wilko rule since that rule was based on
inapplicable American law (the Securities Act).
Although the Supreme Court in Scherk created no more than a spe-
cific, easily distinguishable exception to Wilko, contemporary attitudes
were shifting in favor of arbitration. Commentators seized on Scherk
and lower court cases as indicating a trend at least limiting Wilko.
61
3. Pre-McMahon shift in attitude to favor arbitration
Despite the result in Scherk, not all courts and commentators
thought the Wilko rule was discarded. Most notably, two United States
district courts extended the Wilko reasoning to a new area of law several
years after Scherk; neither Fox v. Merrill Lynch & Co. 62 nor Lewis v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. 63 rejected the Wilko reason-
ing as obsolete. These cases arose from disputes over a pension plan for
brokers, which stipulated that brokers forfeited pension benefits if they
left the company to work for a competitor." The plaintiffs in both cases
were former brokers of Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. who
sued in federal district court claiming the plan violated the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 197465 (ERISA). Each plaintiff had
agreed to be bound by the rules of the New York Stock Exchange, of
which Merrill Lynch was a member, and those rules incorporated an
arbitration agreement.
66
In Lewis, the court noted that ERISA included an anti-waiver pro-
vision67 similar to that provided by the Securities Act in issue in Wilko.
Both anti-waiver provisions sought to protect the public against agree-
ments purporting to waive statutorily granted rights. The court followed
the Wilko Court's reasoning in refusing to compel arbitration.68
The Fox court reached a result opposite Lewis, but within the logic
60. The Court acknowledged that United States securities laws may not even apply to
international transactions. Id. at 518.
61. E.g., Fletcher, Privatizing Securities Disputes Through the Enforcement of Arbitration
'Agreements, 71 MINN. L. REv. 393, 436-38 (1987); Katsoris, supra note 3, at 3.
62. 453 F. Supp. 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
63. 431 F. Supp. 271 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
64. Fox, 453 F. Supp. at 563; Lewis, 431 F. Supp. at 273.
65. 29 U.S.C. § 1110(a) (1976).
66. See Fox, 453 F. Supp. at 563-64; Lewis, 431 F. Supp. at 273.
67. Lewis, 431 F. Supp. at 276 (citing 29 U.S.C. 1110(a) (1976)).
68. Id. The court also noted that ERISAc included provisions on jurisdiction and venue
favorable to plaintiffs, as the Securities Act did in the Wilko case. Id.
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of Wilko. 69 The court considered the applicability of ERISA's anti-
waiver provision to be determinative of the enforceability of the arbitra-
tion agreement, in line with the Wilko reasoning.7" Nonetheless, the
court found the defendants did not fall within the anti-waiver provision
in ERISA, and thus both Lewis and Wilko were inapposite.71
Despite these holdings, the Wilko court's distrust of arbitration 72
was becoming increasingly out of step with shifting attitudes in the legal
community, favoring arbitration as a reasonable and trustworthy means
of alternative dispute resolution.73 This shift in attitude evidenced itself
most prominently in the 1983 Supreme Court case Moses H. Cone Memo-
rial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp. 74 In that case, the Court
spoke of the FAA as reflecting "a liberal federal policy favoring arbitra-
tion" where "any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should
be resolved in favor of arbitration. . . .,,7 These shifting attitudes to-
ward arbitration were not universally presumed to foreshadow the de-
mise of the Wilko rule, however.
The SEC, for one, continued to assume that the Wilko rule was via-
ble. In 1979, a SEC release informed broker-dealers that using predis-
pute arbitration agreements would be considered "inconsistent with just
and equitable principles of trade" unless the agreements informed the
customer of the meaning and enforceability of such a clause.76 Then, in
1983, the SEC confirmed the broad interpretation of the Wilko rule im-
plied in this release:
Wilko v. Swan 346 U.S. 427 (1953), and subsequent cases have
held that Congress had determined that public customers
should have available the special protection of the federal
69. See Fox, 453 F. Supp. at 566.
70. Id.
71. Id at 565-66. ERISA's anti-waiver provision voided only agreements seeking to re-
lieve a fiduciary of statutory duties. Id The defendants in Fox were not fiduciaries, the court
found, so they were outside the scope of the anti-waiver provision. Id
72. The Court characterized arbitration essentially as a trade-off, noting such procedures
could "secure prompt, economical and adequate solution of controversies" but only "if the
parties are willing to accept less certainty of legally correct adjustment." Wilko, 348 U.S. at
438. The Court also assumed arbitrators were ignorant of the law in the concern expressed for
arbitrators deciding cases absent judicial instruction. Id at 436; see also McMahon, 482 U.S.
at 226 (discussing the mistrust of arbitration in Wilko).
73. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, 109 S. Ct. 1917, 1920 (1989)
(citing Alberto-Culver Co. v. Scherk, 484 F.2d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 1973) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing)); Katsoris, supra note 3, at 3.
74. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
75. Id at 24-25.
76. Exchange Act Release No. 15,984, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
82,122, at 81,978 (July 2, 1979).
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courts for the resolution of disputes arising under the federal
securities laws, and that under the anti-waiver provisions of
those laws, that protection may not be waived in advance by
contract of the parties."
In order to effectuate its interpretation of Wilko, the SEC adopted
Rule 15c2-2, which in final form provided in pertinent part:
It shall be a fraudulent, manipulative or deceptive act or prac-
tice for a broker or dealer to enter into an agreement with any
public customer which purports to bind the customer to the
arbitration of future disputes between them arising under the
federal securities laws, or to have in effect such an agreement,
pursuant to which it effects transactions with or for a
customer.78
Reading the rule and the SEC's interpretation of Wilko together
reveals the SEC's firm belief that Wilko was well-established and viable
precedent. Moreover, the SEC saw the principle of Wilko as broadly
applicable to cases arising under various securities laws. If the SEC
thought the Wilko rule should be limited to cases under the Securities
Act, it presumably would have tailored the prohibition against the use of
predispute arbitration agreements accordingly.19 As discussed below,
however, the SEC's rule had a short life.
4. Byrd, the SEC and Soler Chrysler-Plymouth
a. the Byrd decision
In the 1985 case of Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd,80 the United
States Supreme Court addressed procedural questions that arose when a
customer asserted both a Securities Act cause of action, which could not
be arbitrated pursuant to Wilko, and arbitrable pendent state law
claims.8'
77. Exchange Act Release No. 20,397, 48 Fed. Reg. 53,404 (1983).
78. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-2(a) (1986).
79. This broad interpretation appears to be very different from supposing that Wilko rep-
resented an outmoded disfavor of arbitration which the Supreme Court would likely reverse if
presented with the opportunity, as some commentators presumed. See Lindsay, "Public"
Rights and Private Forums: Predispute Arbitration Agreements and Securities Litigation, 20
Loy. L.A.L. REv. 643 (1987). Other commentators continued to view Wilko favorably, as
eminently sensible. See, eg., L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 1193
(1983).
80. 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
81. Id at 214. For purposes of this Note, this case is significant for its treatment of Wilko
and its view of arbitration in general.
The question arose as to whether the courts may refuse arbitration of otherwise arbitrable
[Vol. 24:757
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The majority opinion in Byrd strongly supported the FAA, holding
the order for arbitration mandatory even where that procedure arguably
frustrated the goals of arbitration. 2 The Court dismissed arguments that
arbitration would actually defeat the purpose of the FAA to provide
swift and fair resolution of disputes, because arbitrating this type of dis-
pute would be a slower and more complex means of resolving issues in
the case: "We therefore reject the suggestion that the overriding goal of
the Arbitration Act was to promote the expeditious resolution of
claims." 3
The majority had little to say about Wilko, merely observing in a
footnote that the Wilko rule "has retained considerable vitality in the
lower federal courts." 4 However, Justice White thoroughly addressed
the issue in his concurring opinion. He noted that the issue before the
Court assumed that Exchange Act claims were arbitrable. 5 Justice
White commented that this assumption was "a matter of substantial
doubt" '86 even though the arbitrability of Exchange Act claims was not
before the Court.87 Before Byrd, federal circuit courts had unanimously
found Exchange Act claims non-arbitrable on authority of Wilko;88 Jus-
state law claims when they are "intertwined" with federal, non-arbitrable claims. Id at 216-
17.
Three federal circuit courts of appeals held that arbitration may be refused in this circum-
stance. Id at 216 (citing Byrd v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 72:6 F.2d 552 (9th Cir. 1984);
Belke v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 693 F.2d 1023 (1lth Cir. 1982); Miley v.
Oppenheimer Co., 637 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1981)). Otherwise, the arbitration award and find-
ings supporting it may, through collateral estoppel, effectively preclude the trial; such preclu-
sion would be the equivalent of subjecting non-arbitrable claims to arbitration. Id. at 221.
Moreover, such bifurcated proceedings would be lengthier and more complex than a trial,
defeating the goal of the FAA to promote speedy, efficient resolution of claims. Id at 218-21.
Three other federal circuits held the FAA leaves no room for discretion, and arbitration
must be ordered. Id at 217-21 (citing Surman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
733 F.2d 59 (8th Cir. 1984); Liskey v. Oppenheimer & Co., 717 F.2d 314 (6th Cir. 1983);
Dickinsen v. Heinold Sec., 661 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1981)). The Byrd court agreed with this
position. Id at 217.
This issue has been rendered obsolete by the decision in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/
American Express, 109 S. Ct. 1917 (1989), which is the subject of this Note, since Rodriguez
de Quias makes all federal claims arbitrable. See infra notes 129-72 and accompanying text.
Now that all claims are subject to arbitration, there can no longer be a question of how to
handle claims which are partly arbitrable and partly non-arbitrable.
82. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 217.
83. Id at 219.
84. Id. at 215 n.l.
85. Id at 224 (White, J., concurring).
86. IM (White, J., concurring).
87. Id. (White, ., concurring) (issue was not before the Court because it had not been
raised in lower courts).
88. Cases are cited in McMahon, 482 U.S. at 248 n.6 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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tice White found distinctions between the Securities Act (on which
Wilko relied) and the Exchange Act (the basis for the claim in issue). 9
Justice White stopped short of declaring that these distinctions rendered
Exchange Act claims arbitrable, but nevertheless emphasized "that the
question remains open, and the contrary holdings of the lower courts
must be viewed with some doubt."
9 °
b. SEC and lower court reaction
As a result of Justice White's questioning of the Wilko rule's appli-
cability to Exchange Act claims,91 the SEC decided to suspend enforce-
ment of Exchange Act Rule 15c2-2, which provided that brokers engage
in a deceptive practice by offering arbitration agreements to customers. 92
The former unanimity of lower court findings that the Wilko rule
implicitly prohibited arbitrating Exchange Act claims was shattered fol-
lowing Justice White's concurring opinion. Some courts found Exchange
Act claims arbitrable;93 others reaffirmed prior holdings against arbi-
trability, continuing to follow the Wilko analogy.94 The Ninth Circuit,
apparently confronting the issue for the first time, accepted the Wilko
analogy and held Exchange Act claims non-arbitrable.9"
c. the Soler Chrysler-Plymouth case
Just five months after the Byrd decision, the Supreme Court further
encouraged proponents of arbitration in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth.96 In Soler, the issue was whether antitrust issues
were arbitrable.97 Under prior decisions, predispute arbitration agree-
ments were consistently held unenforceable in relation to antitrust
89. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 224-25 (White, J., concurring).
90. IM at 224 (White, J., concurring).
91. See supra notes 84-90 and accompanying text.
92. Fitterman, SEC Oversight: Investor Complaints Against Broker-dealers and SRO Ad-
ministered Arbitration Systems, in RESOLVING SECURIIEs DiSPUTES, supra note 2, at 205,
225.
93. E.g., Page v. Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden, Inc., 806 F.2d 291, 295 (1st
Cir. 1986); Phillips v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 795 F.2d 1393, 1399 (8th
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 931 (1987); Belke v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 693 F.2d 1023 (1lth Cir. 1982); Sibley v. Tandy Corp., 543 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 824 (1977).
94. E.g., Miller v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 791 F.2d 850 (1lth Cir. 1986).
95. See Conover v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 794 F.2d 520, 522-25 (9th Cir. 1986),
vacated, 482 U.S. 923 (1987).
96. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
97. Id. at 616.
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claims.98 The older cases reasoned that Wilko established a "public pol-
icy" exception to the FAA, under which the courts could refuse arbitra-
tion for litigation which is deemed to bear important public policy
implications.99 In language strongly approving arbitration, the Court re-
jected the "public policy" exception to the FAA, accepting in its place a
rule favoring enforcement of arbitration agreements unless a statutory
exception appears."co Of interest was the Court's reliance on Wilko for
the proposition that exceptions to the FAA must arise from a statute, 101
a reading inconsistent with cases which followed."2
The Court's high regard for arbitration, the growing number of non-
securities cases enforcing arbitration agreements and the emerging con-
ffict (at Justice White's invitation) in the circuit courts of appeal as to the
arbitrability of Exchange Act claims, set the stage for a direct assault on
the arbitrability of securities law disputes. This Note will next discuss
the case which more directly than ever before called into question the
Wilko rule, the Shearson/American Express v. McMahon decision." 3
5. The McMahon case
In Shearson/American Express v. McMahon,10° the plaintiffs were
public customers of the defendant, a securities brokerage house. The
plaintiffs brought suit alleging violations of the Exchange Act and
RICO.105 The defendant sought to enforce an arbitration agreement be-
tween the parties, which the plaintiffs challenged as unenforceable.'
0 6
The district court, applying the "public policy" exception to the FAA,
107
refused to order arbitration of the RICO claim, but held other claims
arbitrable." 8 The court of appeals agreed that RICO claims were inap-
propriate for arbitration under the "public policy" exception, but re-
versed the district court's holding, in reliance on Wilko, that Exchange
98. The seminal case upon which others relied was American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P.
Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968), which explicitly relied on Wilko.
99. This theory is discussed at some length in Sterk, Enforceability of Agreements to Arbi-
trate: An Examination of the Public Policy Defense, 2 CARDozo L. REv. 481 (1981).
100. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. at 624-26.
101. Id. at 627-28.
102. See infra notes 107, 136-38 and accompanying text.
103. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 222.
106. Id. at 223.
107. This is the same exception rejected by the Byrd court. See Byrd, 470 U.S. 213.
108. McMahon v. Shearson/American Express, 618 F. Supp. 384, 387-88 (S.D.N.Y. 1985),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 788 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1986), rev'd, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
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Act claims were not arbitrable.109
The Supreme Court's analysis began with a discussion of the federal
law's approval of arbitration. 0 The Court then turned to the Exchange
Act, which includes an anti-waiver provision essentially identical to the
anti-waiver provision in the Securities Act on which the Wilko Court
relied."' The customers argued that since the two Acts have indistin-
guishable anti-waiver provisions, they must be interpreted identically,
i.e., under the Wilko rule."2 The customers further argued that the arbi-
tration agreement was not voluntary and should not be enforced because
it was an attempt to "'maneuver buyers into a position that might
weaken their ability to recover .... ' "'13
The majority read Wilko as finding the right to a judicial forum
non-waivable solely because the Wilko Court felt the arbitration prac-
tices of the day were inadequate to protect the rights guaranteed under
the Securities Act. 1 4 The McMahon Court relied on the customers' fail-
ure to carry their burden of proof on the voluntariness issue, rather than
examining the arbitration process to meet this argument directly.I" s The
Court continued by evaluating arbitration in the abstract, primarily
through reference to prior cases exalting the virtues of arbitration." 6
The Court next referred to the authority to oversee securities arbitration
that Congress had granted the SEC since Wilko." 7 The Court relied on
this relatively new authority to alleviate stare decisis issues in making a
holding so apparently at odds with Wilko." 8
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall,
issued a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.' 19
This separate opinion specifically criticized two parts of judicial process
109. McMahon v. Shearson/American Express, 788 F.2d 94, 98 (2d Cir. 1986), rev'd, 482
U.S. 220 (1987).
110. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 225-27.
111. Id. at 227-38; Wilko, 346 U.S. at 433 n.18.
112. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 227-29.
113. Id at 231-34 (quoting Wilko v. Swan 346 U.S. 427 (1953)).
114. Id at 243-58. The Rodriguez de QuUas Court interpreted Scherk as not based on the
applicability of American securities law to international transactions, but rather based on the
Court's judgment that arbitration was an adequate forum on the facts of the case. See Rodri-
guez de Quqias, 109 S. Ct. at 1920.
115. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 230-31.
116. Id. at 232-34.
117. Id. at 233-34.
118. Id at 234 ("While stare decisis concerns may counsel against upsetting Wilko's con-
trary conclusion under the Securities Act, we refuse to extend Wilko's reasoning to the Ex-
change Act in light of these intervening regulatory developments.").
119. Id at 242 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting).
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which brought the issue before the Court. 2 ° First, Justice White's sepa-
rate opinion in Byrd cast doubt on a well-settled area of law.121 Second,
the Court disregarded the reasoning behind and overturned the unani-
mous holding of the circuit court of appeal.' 22
Justice Blackmun also disagreed with two premises of the majority's
reasoning. 23 First, the majority was said to have given Wilko "an overly
narrow reading."' 24 The majority viewed Wilko as based on an obsolete
suspicion of arbitration, but, as Justice Blackmun explained, Wilko was
not based solely on the Wilko Court's disfavor of arbitration. 2 ' Rather,
Wilko relied on the Court's interpretation of the intent behind the Securi-
ties Act and whether enforcing arbitration was consistent with that
intent.
126
Second, Justice Blackmun examined existing arbitration practices
closely and found them inadequate. 27 The Wilko Court had noted sev-
eral inadequacies of arbitration, which Justice Blackmun thought still
existed.
28
The McMahon case indicated a poor prognosis for the Wilko rule,
which it indirectly challenged. Just three years later, the Court was
presented with a direct challenge to Wilko in Rodriguez de Quias.
III. RODRIGUEZ DE QUIJAS: STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express,129 the plain-
tiffs were public customers of the defendant broker, Shearson/American
Express (Shearson).' 30 Shearson's standard customer agreement, which
the plaintiffs had signed, included a predispute arbitration agreement. 3 '
The dispute arose from the plaintiffs' investment of approximately
$400,000 with Shearson, which subsequently "turned sour."'3 2 The
120. Ia at 24349 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting).
121. Id. at 24849 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting).
122. Id. at 24349 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting).
123. See id at 249-66 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting).
124. See id at 249 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting).
125. See i. (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting).
126. See id at 250-57 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting).
127. See id at 257-66 (Blackmun, 5., concurring and dissenting).
128. Id. at 259 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting). These inadequacies were simi-
larly overlooked by the Court in Rodriguez de Qui7as. See infra notes 199-206 and accompa-
nying text.
129. 109 S. Ct. 1917 (1989).
130. Id at 1918-19.
131. Id
132. Id. The opinion does not clarify how much of the investment was lost. Since the suit
presented a federal question allowing jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988), id at
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plaintiffs sued Shearson and the individual broker in charge of the ac-
counts on various legal theories under both state and federal law, alleging
the losses occurred through unauthorized and fraudulent transactions. 33
The complaint alleged violations of the same statute that was at issue in
Wilko v. Swan,'13 4 section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933.1"5 The
United States District Court felt bound by Wilko, and accordingly or-
dered the parties into arbitration on all claims except those arising under
the Securities Act.
1 36
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed as to the holding that
the Securities Act claims were not arbitrable, even though it acknowl-
edged that Wilko was directly on point and required a contrary result. 37
The appellate court stated that the development of case law since Wilko
had reduced Wilko's precedential value to "obsolescence." 3 ' The
United States Supreme Court seemed to agree.
IV. REASONNG OF THE COURT
A. Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court began its analysis with a discussion of Wilko v.
Swan, 13 which was described as resolving the competing legislative poli-
cies in the Securities Act and the FAA."4 In Wilko, a predispute arbi-
tration agreement was held to constitute a stipulation in violation of the
Securities Act prohibition against stipulations to "waive compliance with
any provision" of the Act.14' The Rodriguez de Quias Court noted that
this resolution was not an obvious conclusion compelled by statutory lan-
guage, which the Court felt could reasonably be read as prohibiting only
waivers of substantive provisions. 42 The Court discerned two reasons
why Wilko rejected such a reading: (1) the Wilko Court did not accept
arbitration as a form of trial, so that a predispute arbitration agreement
1919, rather than depending on diversity, the amount involved could even have been less than
the $50,000 required for diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988).
133. Rodriguez de Qugias, 109 S. Ct. at 1919.
134. 346 U.S. 427, 428-29 (1953).
135. Rodriguez de Quijas, 109 S. Ct. at 1919 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1990)).
136. Id
137. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Lehman Bros., 845 F.2d 1296 (5th Cir. 1988), aff'd,
490 U.S. 477 (1989).
138. Id at 1299.
139. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
140. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, 109 S. Ct. 1917, 1919-20 (1989).
For a discussion of Wilko, see supra notes 20-46 and accompanying text.
141. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 434.
142. Rodriguez de Quias, 109 S. Ct. at 1919.
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was an impermissible waiver of" 'the right to select a judicial forum' "143
and (2) this right to a wide choice of courts and venues is particularly
valuable in securities litigation because customers are in an unequal bar-
gaining position with securities dealers.'"
The Rodriguez de Quijas Court disagreed with Wilko's reasoning,
which was viewed as a product of" 'the old judicial hostility toward arbi-
tration.' ,,141 The Court then presented three reasons why the Wilko rule
was incorrect. First, the majority observed that judicial attitudes toward
arbitration had shifted to favor arbitration. 1" Moreover, the majority
observed, recent cases before the Court uniformly endorsed arbitration as
affording a means of resolving matters without sacrifice of substantive
rights. 4 7 Therefore, the Court considered Wilko outdated in its view
that arbitration is an inadequate forum to uphold significant substantive
rights.148 The Wilko view was considered especially outmoded since the
SEC had gained regulatory authority over arbitration procedures, and
thus could assure fair arbitration procedures. 49
Second, the Court disagreed with Wilko's conclusion that only a
judicial forum could preserve essential rights granted the buyer of securi-
ties, and that consequently, a statutory prohibition against waiving rights
granted by the statute should be construed to include a right to a judicial
forum.' 10 The Court noted two post-Wilko cases holding similar anti-
waiver provisions in other statutes did not prevent enforcement of a
predispute arbitration agreement.'
Shearson/American Express v. McMahon 152 was particularly per-
suasive since it dealt with an anti-waiver provision in a securities statute,
the Exchange Act, which was essentially the same as the anti-waiver pro-
vision in Wilko.15 3 The only potentially relevant difference between the
Acts examined in Wilko and McMahon was the extent of jurisdiction
143. Id. (quoting Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953)).
144. Id. at 1919-20.
145. d at 1920 (quoting Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d
978, 985 (2d Cir. 1942)). It is interesting that the Supreme Court criticizes its own precedent,
Wilko, as outdated by reference to a case that predates Wilko.
146. Id
147. Id
148. Id
149. Id: at 1921.
150. Id at 1920.
151. Id at 1920-21 (citing Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987);
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614 (1985)).
152. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
153. Rodriguez de Qu6fas, 109 S. Ct. at 1921. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1990) (anti-
waiver provision of Securities Act) with 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1990) (anti-waiver provision of
Exchange Act).
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created by the underlying statutes. The Securities Act, construed in
Wilko, allowed suits in state and federal court and prohibited removal;1" 4
the Exchange Act, construed in McMahon created exclusive federal ju-
risdiction. 5 The Rodriguez de Quifas Court found this difference insig-
nificant, but explained that since an arbitration agreement merely
provided an additional choice of venue, enforcing an arbitration agree-
ment would further the statutory purpose of the Securities Act to provide
a choice of forums.
1 56
The third and final reason cited for the Rodriguez de Quias Court's
disagreement with Wilko was the strong policy in favor of arbitration
established by the FAA. 5 The Court found in the record no showing
that arbitration would be an inadequate forum and felt compelled to con-
clude that arbitration would provide an adequate forum."' Thus, the
Court placed a new burden of proof on the party opposing arbitration: to
demonstrate that arbitration is inadequate." 9 Moreover, the majority
noted that arbitration agreements are subject to contract defenses under
state or federal law, which the Court felt provided adequate protection
for buyers." Having thus set forth its disagreement with Wilko, the
Court turned to a discussion of stare decisis issues involved in overruling
Wilko. The first of these was the propriety of the decision of the circuit
court of appeals.1 61 As noted above, that court elected not to follow
Wilko, even though it was a Supreme Court precedent squarely on point,
on the ground that subsequent Supreme Court cases made Wilko obso-
lete. 62 The Supreme Court disapproved of the circuit court's action in
154. Rodriguez de Quias, 109 S. Ct. at 1921.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id
158. Under the FAA, the Court declared, "the party opposing arbitration carries the bur-
den of showing that Congress intended in a separate statute to preclude a waiver of judicial
remedies, or that such a waiver of judicial remedies inherently conflicts with the underlying
purposes of that other statute." Id.
159. Id. at 1921-22. Before this case, arbitration would have been considered inadequate as
a matter of law under Wilko, of course.
160. Id at 1921. The Court did not consider the possibility that a broker would seek to
avoid arbitration. While it is true that a broker could simply never offer an arbitration agree-
ment to customers if the dealer wishes to avoid arbitration, this only applies to brokers who
wish to avoid arbitration in general. It does not apply to a broker who favors arbitration in
general but perceives an advantage in a particular case by proceeding in court. By assuming
only customers would seek to avoid arbitration, the Court implicitly acknowledged that the
usual case arises from a dealer seeking to force arbitration on an unwilling customer. The
Court did not address why this should be so if arbitration is equivalent to a judicial forum, as
the Court assumed in its reasoning. See infra notes 214-23 and accompanying text.
161. Rodriguez de Quijas, 109 S. Ct. at 1921-22.
162. See infra notes 188-98 and accompanying text.
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disregarding precedent, stating that lower courts should leave to the
Supreme Court "the prerogative of overruling its own decisions."
163
The Court's second stare decisis issue concerned its general reluc-
tance to overrule its own decisions.'" The Court found several compel-
ling justifications for overturning Wilko. First, decisions interpreting
statutory language are appropriately overruled to obtain uniform inter-
pretation of similarly worded provisions. 165 McMahon dealt with an
anti-waiver provision essentially identical to the provision of the Securi-
ties Act at issue in both Wilko and Rodriguez de Quias, and held the
anti-waiver provision was no bar to specific enforcement of predispute
arbitration agreements. The Rodriguez de Quijas Court emphasized that
the Exchange Act (in issue in McMahon) was to be construed consist-
ently with the statute in Wilko.' 66 The Rodriguez de Quias Court,
which had decided McMahon only two years before, not surprisingly
found that if one of these two cases should be overruled, it should be
Wilko. 6 7
Second, the Court noted that decisions which interpret statutes con-
trary to congressional policies, as established in other legislation, should
be overturned to bring construction of the statute in line with congres-
sional policy.'68 Because the FAA expressed such a strong congressional
policy, the majority concluded that Wilko should be overruled.1
69
B. The Dissent
Justice Stevens authored a fairly brief dissent in Rodriguez de
Qujas, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun.' 71 The dis-
sent observed that in the more than thirty-five years Wilko was law, Con-
gress rewrote no laws implying dissatisfaction with the Wilko rule.
17 1
The dissent suggested that Congress should be the source of changes that
the Court was making in overruling Wilko. Justice Stevens noted that
163. Rodriguez de Quyias, 109 S. Ct. at 1922.
164. Id
165. Id, (citing Commissioner v. Estate of Church, 335 U.S. 632, 649-50 (1949)).
166. Id
167. Id
168. Id (citing Boys Markets v. Retail Clerks, 398 U.S. 235, 240-41 (1970) (overruling
Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962))).
169. Id at 1921. The Court did not make entirely clear which congressional policy was
referenced. Although the FAA was not explicitly stated to be the congressional policy which
the Court felt encouraged overruling Wilko, it appears to be the only statute the Court could
be referring to in light of its discussion of the FAA. See id
170. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Lehman Bros., 109 S. Ct. 1917, 1922-23 (1989) (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting).
171. Id. at 1923 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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valid arguments could be made on both sides of the issue, none of which
were so compelling as to justify overturning such a well-established
rule.
172
V. ANALYSIS
In Rodriguez de Quifas v. Shearson/American Express,173 the United
States Supreme Court set a new course for litigation of securities cus-
tomer disputes. Arbitration agreements, which a few years earlier ap-
peared clearly unenforceable,174 had now received the Supreme Court's
imprimatur.
This section begins with a critique on the reasoning of the Rodriguez
de Quias Court. This section will then analyze the postulate central to
the Court's rationale, that arbitration is a suitable alternative means of
resolving securities disputes.
The majority in Rodriguez de Quias questioned Wilko v. Swan 175
and then presented three grounds for disagreeing with Wilko to justify
overruling it.1 76 The following subsections suggest that neither the ma-
jority's questioning of Wilko, nor the Court's grounds for overruling
Wilko can be logically justified.
A. The Majority's Questioning of Wilko
The Rodriguez de QuiYas majority questioned the Wilko Court's in-
terpretation of the Securities Act anti-waiver provision.1 77 The majority
noted that the anti-waiver provision of the Securities Act could be read
as applying only to substantive rights, and not to the procedural rights at
issue in Wilko. 78 The Court then slighted the Wilko Court's resolution
of the inconsistency between the FAA and the Securities Act as one not
172. Id at 1922-23 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens noted that a weighing of both
sides was already accomplished in Wilko. See id at 1923 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting). It
appears that his point is that precedents of this sort, involving close questions of non-constitu-
tional dimensions, will have little value if the Court demonstrates a willingness to overturn
such decisions whenever it feels the scales tip one way or the other.
173. 109 S. Ct. 1917 (1989).
174. The issue seemed so clear that the SEC considered the simple act of offering an arbitra-
tion agreement to a customer unethical. The SEC noted at least as early as 1977 that offering
arbitration agreements to public customers was questionable since the agreements were unen-
forceable under current law, and offering the agreement could be seen as suggesting the agree-
ment was binding. Exchange Act Release No. 13,470, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-2(a) (1986),
rescinded in Exchange Act Release No. 25,034, 52 Fed. Reg. 39,216 (1987).
175. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
176. Rodriguez de Quijas, 109 S. Ct. at 1922.
177. Id
178. Id
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obviously required by the language of the statute.179 The clear implica-
tion was that the decision of the Wilko majority should be afforded no
more weight than a coin toss, but the Court's reasoning was vague and
unsupportable.
The Rodriguez de Quias majority failed to elucidate why a statute
prohibiting waiver of "any provision' ° should be read as prohibiting
only waivers of any substantive provision.18' Surely, the Court was not
suggesting that procedural issues could never be important, as such mat-
ters are of sufficient import to determine the outcome of many cases. In
fact, two famous cases in the evolution of the Erie doctrine recognized
the importance of procedural issues by accordingly modifying the "out-
come determinative" procedural/substantive test."8 2 Thus, the Court's
179. Id
180. 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1989) (emphasis added). Although the Court did not clearly explain
this point, commentators have made an argument against Wilko which reaches the same con-
clusion. See, eg., Fletcher, supra note 61, at 406-07.
Fletcher argues that the anti-waiver provision cannot be interpreted literally to prohibit
waiving any rights whatsoever. Ia Rather, since the statute voids waiving compliance with
any provision, it should be read as preventing waivers of those provisions with which the
broker must comply, i.e., the substantive provisions of the Securities Act. Id. at 406. The
argument also attempts to refute the logic of the Wilko position by carrying it to (or perhaps
beyond) its logical extreme, to show that it leads to absurd results. Thus, Fletcher offers the
example that if the customer cannot contractually surrender the right to litigate in court, the
customer could never settle a case. Id at 407. What is settlement, he argues, if not a contrac-
tual agreement to waive the right to proceed with litigation? Id
Proponents of this position correctly contend that the blanket rule of Wilko is unjustified;
but, they fail to establish that the blanket prohibition of arbitration under Wilko should be
replaced by a blanket rule favoring arbitration. See infra notes 296-330 and accompanying
text.
The argument that Wilko is illogical because it would prevent settlements seems to be
based upon a false analogy between predispute arbitration agreements and post-dispute settle-
ments. Settlements are usually agreed upon after the threat of litigation. 15A AM. JUR. 2D
Compromise & Settlement § 1 (1976). Wilko does not prohibit agreements to arbitrate at that
point in time. See, eg., Gardner v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 433 F.2d 367, 368 (5th Cir.
1970), cert denied, 401 U.S. 978 (1971); Moran v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, 389 F.2d
242, 246 (3d Cir. 1968).
Moreover, while it may be inconceivable that Congress could have intended to prohibit
settlements agreed upon freely by the parties, it is not at all unlikely that Congress could have
wished to prevent brokers from avoiding the Securities Act by contracting for a forum not
bound to follow the law, such as arbitration.
181. Rodriguez de Quyjas, 109 S. Ct. at 1922.
182. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356
U.S. 525 (1958). Earlier cases had suggested federal procedural rules must be considered sub-
stantive, and hence give way to state law in diversity cases whenever the rule could be "out-
come determinative." See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949); Woods
v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949). In Hanna and Byrd, the Supreme Court ac-
knowledged that procedural rules can determine outcome by abandoning strict adherence to
the old "outcome determinative" rule. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 467-68; Byrd, 356 U.S. at 538.
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reading of Wilko is insupportable.
B. The Court's Grounds for Overturning Wilko
1. Judicial attitudes toward arbitration
The first of the three reasons for overturning Wilko that the major-
ity offered was the shift in judicial attitudes toward favoring arbitra-
tion." 3 The majority viewed Wilko as a product of "'the old judicial
hostility to arbitration.' """ Having dismissed the Wilko Court's hold-
ing as the result of an outdated bias, the Court substituted its more mod-
em bias in favor of arbitration by unreasoned exhortation.
Commentators on legal process have sometimes contended that
legal reasoning is based largely on value judgments, but the process still
rests on logical reasoning from statutes and precedent.I s' If changes in
judicial attitudes are accepted as a sound basis for overruling precedent,
however, the Court should decide cases by opinion polls rather than
opinions.
2. Arbitration as an adequate forum
Whether arbitration can adequately protect the customer's statutory
rights calls for reasoned analysis, but the majority offered none. Instead,
the Court contented itself with citation to other, equally uncritical analy-
ses of the process.'
8 6
The Court's citation to numerous cases lauding arbitration cannot
relieve the Court of the duty to follow precedent interpreting the laws of
Congress. If Wilko correctly analyzed the intent of Congress in resolving
the conflict between the FAA policy in favor of arbitration and the Se-
curities Act anti-waiver provision policy,' it should hardly matter
183. Rodriguez de Qujias, 109 S. Ct. at 1920.
184. Id (quoting Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 985
(2d Cir. 1942)).
185. For example, Justice Holmes commented in 1897:
The language of judicial decision is mainly the language of logic. And the logical
method and form flatter that longing for certainty and repose which is in every
human mind. But certainty generally is an illusion, and repose is not the destiny of
man. Behind the logical form lies a judgment as to the relative worth and impor-
tance of competing legislative grounds, often an inarticulate and unconscious judg-
ment, it is true, and yet the very root and nerve of the whole proceeding.
Address by Justice Holmes (Mar. 25, 1897), reprinted in Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10
HARv. L. REv. 457, 465-66 (1897).
186. Rodiguez de QuiFas, 109 S. Ct. at 1919-20 (citing Shearson/American Express v. Mc-
Mahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S.
614 (1985); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985); Moses H. Cone Memo-
rial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983)).
187. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438.
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whether a majority of the Supreme Court agrees with the way Congress
wrote the laws.
Viewing Rodriguez de Quias in its historical context raises more
basic issues as to the intellectual honesty of the opinion. The Court's
reasoning relied heavily on Shearson/American Express v. McMahon,
which the Court found so inconsistent with Wilko that both decisions
could not stand together."' The Court had decided McMahon only two
years before; the Court therefore justified overruling Wilko because of an
inconsistency which the Court, itself, had recently created, despite the
fact that the Court ignored the same inconsistency in deciding McMa-
hon. The process leading the Court to Rodriguez de Quijas resembles
that of a doctor seeking to euthanize a patient whose ill health arose from
the physician's neglect. Likewise, the Court justified overruling Wilko as
a precedent in poor health when Wilko's infirmity was of the Court's
own making. If Wilko and McMahon are so fatally inconsistent, perhaps
the Court should have considered the matter in writing McMahon.
A closer comparison of Wilko and McMahon reveals an important
distinction between them, not discussed by the majority. Both cases
dealt with statutes designed to regulate securities that included provi-
sions nullifying agreements which avoid the protection afforded by the
statutes.189 But the Securities Act includes broad jurisdiction and venue
provisions that give customers the right to choose between state and fed-
eral court, by granting concurrent jurisdiction in each and prohibiting
removal. 19' The Exchange Act, by contrast, merely provides for federal
jurisdiction. 191
The different jurisdictional grants call for differing treatment of the
two Acts. The broader jurisdiction under the Securities Act, together
with the prohibition on removal to federal court, evidences a congres-
sional desire to afford the customer a choice of forum at the outset of
litigation.192 The Exchange Act, at issue in McMahon, involves no sug-
188. Rodriguez de Quijas, 109 S. Ct. at 1922.
189. See Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 222 (1987) (addressing
the Exchange Act); Wilko, 346 U.S. at 434 (addressing the Securities Act).
190. See 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1989).
191. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1989).
192. The Court noted in Rodriguez de Quijas the usual rule that the Securities Act and the
Exchange Act are interpreted harmoniously. Rodriguez de Quijas, 109 S. Ct. at 1922 (citing
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 206 (1976)). Since customer complaints frequently
include counts under both Acts, eg., Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 214
(1985), inconsistent interpretations of the two Acts could lead to attempts to frame pleadings
under one or the other Act to take advantage of any differences in interpretation the Court
allows.
Of course, this should not be of concern when there could be no conceivable advantage to
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gestion of congressional intent to empower aggrieved securities custom-
ers to select between different forums.193 The jurisdictional provision in
the Exchange Act evidences no more than an intent to open the federal
courts to enforce rights granted by thp Act without requiring diversity of
citizenship.194 The FAA would be reduced to little effect if the Court
were to hold that this very ordinary grant of federal question jurisdiction
renders arbitration agreements unenforceable despite the FAA. On the
other hand, the special power to choose a forum to litigate afforded ag-
grieved securities customers under the Securities Act, is more easily seen
as an intended exception to the FAA, as the Wilko Court saw it.195
The Rodriguez de Quijas majority avoided considering whether the
broader grant of jurisdiction in the Securities Act distinguished Wilko
from McMahon by presuming that a predispute arbitration agreement
represents a broadening of customer forum choices rather than a vehicle
for narrowing choices. 196 The suggestion of the Rodriguez de Quyas ma-
jority that predispute arbitration agreements are merely "'a specialized
kind of forum selection clause' ... allowing buyers of securities a broader
right to select the forum for resolving disputes" '19 7 is plainly wrong in
most cases. Predispute arbitration agreements are a one-way street be-
cause they give the customer no new options; only the broker gains
through such agreements. The customer usually has a right to compel
the broker to arbitrate regardless of the existence of a predispute
agreement.1
98
such adept pleading maneuvers. This need for consistency in interpretation therefore has no
application in the Rodriguez de Quias factual scenario. Claims subject to arbitration would be
arbitrated whether or not Securities Act claims were arbitrable. Under Byrd, the district court
would be required to stay court proceedings pending resolution of the arbitration, which would
leave nothing to litigate in court if the Securities Act claims were a sham designed to somehow
take advantage of the fact that such claims are not subject to compelled arbitration. See Byrd,
470 U.S. at 218-21. Since the customer would gain nothing by sham pleadings designed to
take advantage of a difference in arbitrability of claims, there is less apparent reason to insist
that the Acts be interpreted harmoniously.
193. See McMahon, 482 U.S. at 227-28.
194. See 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1988).
195. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 437.
196. Rodriguez de Quias, 109 S. Ct. at 1921.
197. Id. (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974)).
198. For instance, because most securities trading is done through exchanges, such as the
New York Stock Exchange, members agree to be bound by the rules of the exchange. See
FIFTH REPORT OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION, reprinted in
RESOLVING SEcuRIES DIspuTrs, supra note 2, at 110 app. B. Major exchanges are partici-
pants in the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration, and many have formed SROs as an
arbitration forum. Id Such SROs in 1979 and 1980 accepted the Uniform Code of Arbitra-
tion as their procedural rules, which provides that any dispute between a customer and a
member is subject to arbitration initiated either by demand of the broker pursuant to a written
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3. Arbitration policy issues
After questioning Wilko with an unworkable distinction, substitut-
ing a judicial popularity contest in the guise of "judicial attitudes" for
reasoned analysis, and ignoring critical distinctions between the Securi-
ties Act and the Exchange Act, the Rodriguez de Quias majority touted
congressional policy as evidenced by the FAA to justify its holding.
The Court ignored the fact that the Wilko Court had considered
congressional policies,199 as well, so that the majority was merely expres-
sing a disagreement with Wilko in this discussion rather than covering
new ground. While the Wilko majority unquestionably had a less auspi-
cious view of arbitration,2"' Wilko recognized more than Rodriguez de
Qugas that the Court's decision should be the outgrowth of legal reason-
ing rather than the personal views of the Justices.2"' The Wilko majority
appreciated the strong federal policy favoring arbitration as evidenced by
the FAA, but it also appreciated that "[t]his hospitable attitude of legis-
latures and courts toward arbitration, however, does not solve our ques-
tion .... "202 In both Rodriguez de Quyas and Wilko, the issue was not
whether arbitration was favored or disfavored by the courts, but rather
whether Congress intended to create an exception to the FAA through
the anti-waiver provision of the Securities Act.2" 3 Thus, the Rodriguez
de Quias majority's homage to federal pro-arbitration policy was
inapposite.
The Rodriguez de Quijas majority's reliance on federal pro-arbitra-
tion policy appears all the more misplaced in light of its silence in re-
sponse to the dissent's inferences of congressional intent.2" In the thirty-
six years between Wilko and Rodriguez de Quijas, Congress had not seen
fit to rise to the defense of the FAA; to the contrary, Congress had ap-
proved of Wilko by name and had stated an intent to leave the Wilko
rule undisturbed.2"5
predispute arbitration agreement or by demand of the customer. Id. Thus, the only disputes
the customer could not resolve through arbitration, even in the absence of a predispute agree-
ment, are the relatively rare transactions outside of any exchange.
199. See Wilko, 346 U.S. at 431-35.
200. See id. at 431-32.
201. Id. at 433-34.
202. Id. at 432.
203. Rodriguez de Quias, 109 S. Ct. at 1919-20; Wilko, 346 U.S. at 431-33.
204. See Rodriguez de Quijas, 109 S. Ct. at 1920; id at 1923 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
205. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 229, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 321, 342. ("It was the clear understanding of the conferees that this
amendment did not change existing law, as articulated in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953),
concerning the effect of arbitration procedural provisions in agreements entered into by per-
sons dealing with members and participants in self-regulatory organizations.").
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The Rodriguez de Quias majority respect for congressional intent
vis-a-vis the FAA also appears misplaced when compared to the failure to
respect or even discuss congressional policies underlying the Securities
Act. While Wilko recognized that the issue involved two competing fed-
eral policies,2 "6 the Rodriguez de Quias majority's discussion of federal
pro-arbitration policy turned a deaf ear to one side of the issue.
The Rodriguez de Quijas majority adopted a similarly one-sided ap-
proach in its willingness to argue from principles not proven in the rec-
ord before the Court. The majority embraced the assumption, stated
without reference to supporting evidence, that arbitration offers
"'prompt, economical and adequate solution of controversies.' "207 The
majority's willingness to accept these unproven assumptions208 favorable
to arbitration was very different from its treatment of the arguments
raised by the customer/petitioners. While freely accepting postulates
supporting arbitration, the majority relied on the silence in the record in
concluding that the petitioners had failed to carry "their burden of show-
ing that arbitration agreements are not enforceable under the Securities
Act."20 9 The majority offered no suggestion as to what the customer/
petitioners should have done to meet this burden, beyond their reliance
on Supreme Court precedent which had stood as good law for over
thirty-five years and was squarely on point: the Wilko case.
The Rodriguez de Quijas majority showed a similar aversion to look-
ing beyond the record in brushing aside petitioners' arguments that
agreements to arbitrate in this context were adhesive in nature. 210 The
majority's reasoning thus displays a marked asymmetry in the Court's
openness to assumptions beyond the record and suggests that the major-
ity's defense of its decision was more of an after-the-fact rationalization
than an explanation of the basis for its opinion.
The recurring theme in the Rodriguez de Quias majority opinion is
clearly the perceived strength of federal policy in favor of arbitration as a
fair and suitable substitute for judicial protection of rights. Without the
majority's strong defense of the arbitration process, Wilko would still be
good law.
206. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438.
207. Rodriguez de Quifas, 109 S. Ct. at 1919 (quoting Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438
(1953)).
208. These assumptions appear to be more controversial than the Rodriguez de QuUas ma-
jority suggests. See infra notes 211-305 and accompanying text.
209. Rodriguez de Qu6ias, 109 S. Ct. at 1921.
210. Id ("Although petitioners suggest that the agreement to arbitrate here was adhesive in
nature, the record contains no factual showing sufficient to support that suggestion.")
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C. Suitability of Arbitration as an Alternative Means in Securities
Disputes
The Rodriguez de Quijas majority joined certain commentators in
the opinion that arbitration offers swift, simple and efficient resolution of
disputes through informal and streamlined procedures.211 Neither the
Court nor these commentators, however, have explained why the Court
has failed to adopt such procedures in the federal courts, if the proce-
dures are, indeed, both fair to all and more efficient.2 12
It is no answer to declare that those who dislike arbitration may
refuse to agree to arbitrate, exercising their right to the more formal pro-
cedures available in the courts; if judicial procedure offers only ineffi-
cient, needless formalities compared to arbitration, the right to a judicial
forum is pointless. The alternatives, then, are to conclude that existing
judicial procedure is a collection of nonsensical formalities promoting
inefficiency, or to admit that whatever the merits of arbitration, it lacks
some of the safeguards of litigation.213
If it is conceded that arbitration lacks the safeguards available in
court, the question of the inherent fairness of arbitration becomes more
important. There is no reason to impose the formality of court upon
litigants where the nature of the dispute does not require it, especially
where litigants are willing to accept the possibility of a less safeguarded
resolution in exchange for the efficiencies of arbitration. This Note next
examines the arbitration process itself.
1. Customer resistance to arbitration
The Rodriguez de Quias majority praised arbitration primarily by
reference to Shearson/American Express v. McMahon.214 Throughout its
211. Compare id. at 1920 with Fletcher, supra note 61, at 458 and Katsoris, supra note 3, at
3 (presenting similar arguments favoring arbitration of securities disputes).
212. The Supreme Court is vested with limited rule-making power under which it promul-
gates, inter alia, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1988). Even if
limits on rule-making authority may prevent the Court from replacing the federal judicial
system with a set of arbitration-like proceedings, the Court could at least urge Congress to
change conflicting statutes.
213. The Wilko Court recognized that arbitration does not and can not offer all the safe-
guards of judicial process, but rather offers an alternative to litigation "if the parties are willing
to accept less certainty of legally correct adjustment." Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438
(1953).
214. 482 U.S. 220 (1987). The Rodriguez de Qujas Court stated:
And in McMahon we explained at length why we rejected the Wilko Court's aversion
to arbitration as a forum for resolving disputes over securities transactions, especially
in light of the relatively recent expansion of the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion's authority to oversee and to regulate those arbitration procedures. We need not
repeat those arguments here.
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opinion, the majority presumed that disputes over arbitration of cus-
tomer-broker disputes arise only in the factual context of a broker seek-
ing to force a reluctant customer out of court and into arbitration.
21 5 If
arbitration is deserving of the confidence the majority bestowed upon it,
why are customers so uniformly resistant to it?
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, offered
one answer in their separate opinion to McMahon:
[T]here remains the danger that, at worst, compelling an inves-
tor to arbitrate securities claims puts him in a forum controlled
by the securities industry.... The uniform opposition of inves-
tors to compelled arbitration and the overwhelming support of
the securities industry for the process suggest that there must
be some truth to the investors' belief that the securities industry
has an advantage in a forum under its own control.2 6
Justice Blackmun continued by quoting the more blunt assessment by
Sheldon H. Elsen, Chairman of the American Bar Association Task
Force on Securities Arbitration: "'The [brokerage] houses basically like
the present system because they own the stacked deck.' ,217
Commentators favoring arbitration claim that these criticisms are
mere suspicions, unjustified by the facts.2"' They argue that since indus-
try statistics show that customers win approximately fifty percent of the
disputes submitted to industry arbitration forums (called self-regulated
organizations, or SROs), the procedure must be fair to customers.21 9
This reasoning fails to offer comparison statistics, and thus proves
little about the fairness of arbitration. Certainly, these statistics show
that industry SROs are not a sham forum in which the customer cannot
win, but without statistics from alternative forums these statistics show
little more than that. For example, if the customers would have won
ninety percent of the same cases before a judicial forum, arbitration sta-
Rodriguez de Qu6Fas, 109 S. Ct. at 1921 (citation omitted).
215. Rodriguez de Quias, 109 S. Ct. at 1921-22. All reported cases seem to arise this way.
See Lindsay, supra note 79, at 665 n.127.
216. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 260-61 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting).
217. Id. at 261 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting N.Y. Times, Mar. 29,
1987, §" 3, at 8, col. 1).
218. See Fletcher, supra note 61, at 452-53; Katsoris, supra note 3, at 3.
219. See, eg., Fletcher, supra note 61, at 452. Fletcher relies very heavily on this argument:
"The most important indicator that arbitration before the exchanges [the securities industry
SROs] is a fair mechanism for customers is that customers win their disputes in those arbitra-
tion proceedings." Id. at 452-53. The author fails to offer any argument or authority that the
customers winning those arbitrations received an award comparable to what they would have
received in a judicial forum, and similarly fails to advance any support for the proposition that
an approximate 50% win level for customers is fair. Id.
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tistics prove the opposite of what the commentators claim the numbers
demonstrate.
Moreover, this argument fails to address the quantum of recovery in
arbitration. If the customer does not gain full compensation before an
arbitral forum, the process works an obvious injustice.
The greatest problem with this statistical argument is that it fails to
address the real issue, namely that "[i]t is not of some importance but is
of fundamental importance that justice should not only be done, but
should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done.""22 Securities
arbitration cases typically involve a customer seeking to avoid a broker's
attempt to force arbitration, strongly implying that customers perceive
arbitration as so disadvantageous compared with judicial proceedings
that the difference justifies extensive litigation.221
The lack of public trust in arbitration presents no less a problem if it
could somehow be proven undeserved.22 2 This mistrust has implications
beyond the litigants: "The public's perception of fairness, however, must
be zealously guarded, for it extends far beyond the issue of arbitration. It
goes to the very heart of the public's trust in the securities markets them-
selves; and, this trust must be preserved for those markets to stay
healthy.
223
Questions about the potential fairness of arbitration as an alternative
forum do not arise solely through inferences from the procedural context
of these cases. More serious questions flow from a closer examination of
220. King v. Sussex Justices, 1 K.B. 256, 259 (1924).
221. Even commentators who favor arbitration acknowledge that whether or not deserved,
arbitration does not enjoy the customers' trust. See, eg., Robbins, A Practitioner's Guide to
Securities Dispute Resolution, in RESOLVING SEcuRrrms DisruTs, supra note 2, at 17.
222. This is probably beyond scientific proof. Statistics offered by arbitration proponents do
not adequately resolve the issue. See Fletcher, supra note 61, at 452-53. Scientifically rigorous
proof should require submission of a significant number of randomly selected disputes to both
arbitration and litigation, followed by statistical analysis of the results for any significant differ-
ences. Alternatively, a large number of disputes could be randomly assigned to resolution in
either arbitration or litigation, and the results compared. Neither experiment appears feasible.
Absent advance, random assignment of disputes to one forum or the other, only a retro-
spective study of the results of litigation versus arbitration is possible. Any such study would
face the difficult task of demonstrating that the forum for resolving the dispute is the only
variable that could explain any differences found. For example, how could the authors of such
a study exclude the possibility that differences in the nature of the disputes, themselves, lead to
both the parties' agreement to arbitrate and differences in the results in each forum?
Katsoris reports an informal survey finding that not all brokerage houses require arbitra-
tion agreements. Katsoris, supra note 3, at 4 n.4. A study comparing results of one house in
litigation with another that arbitrates all customer disputes would appear profitable, particu-
larly if the litigation history of each house and other factors suggested each house in the study
was comparable except in the choice of forum for dispute resolution.
223. Katsoris, supra note 3, at 15.
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the arbitration process itself in resolving securities disputes between cus-
tomers and brokers.
2. Unavailability of discovery in arbitration
Discovery procedures which are a vital part of judicial proceedings
are limited or even unavailable in arbitration.224 Commentators favoring
arbitration point to this as an advantage, denying that it is a hardship on
the customer:
Extensive pretrial discovery permitted in the courts (e.g., depo-
sitions, written interrogatories, bills of particulars, production
of documents or other things) is not available in securities arbi-
tration proceedings. Why not? Because such discovery "tools"
can be expensive and burdensome, a stalling tactic, a nuisance,
an effort to wear down one's opponent, and, in short, contrary
to the objective of arbitration as an expeditious, cost-effective
alternative to the courts.225
This argument proves too much; all the same criticisms may be
made against discovery under federal rules,226 even though such abuses
of discovery are equally contrary to the objective of the federal rules.227
The logical conclusion from these arguments is that the prevailing prac-
tice of allowing discovery without direct court supervision should be
scrapped, not that arbitration's lack of discovery is generally an advan-
tage over litigation.
Seen in this light, the argument of these commentators that limiting
discovery to whatever the arbitrators see fit to approve228 becomes a radi-
224. See Neville, The Enforcement of Arbitration Clauses in Investor-Broker Agreements,
ARB. J., Mar. 1979, at 5, 9.
225. D. RonmNs, AN INsIDER's GUIDE TO SECURITIES ARBITRATION 14 (1985); accord
Fletcher, supra note 61, at 453-54.
226. FED. R. Civ. P. 26. The same point may be made under state discovery rules. See,
e.g., CAL. CiV. PRoc. CODE §§ 2016, 2023 (West 1988).
227. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rules (including the discovery provisions
of Rule 26) "shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action." FED. R. Civ. P. 1. Moreover, Rule II requires discovery requests to be signed,
and "[t]he signature ... constitutes a certificate... that (the discovery] is not interposed for
any improper purpose such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in
the cost of litigation." FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
228. The typical extent of discovery in arbitration is what the arbitrator(s) allow(s) plus
whatever the other side will voluntarily agree upon. See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. § 7 (1970); UNIV,
CODE OF ARBrrRATION § 20 (1986), reprinted in RESOLVING SECURmES DISPUTES, supra
note 2, at 101 app. A; AMERICAN ARBrRATION ASS'N, SECURrTES ARBrrRATION RULEs 8-9
(1989) [hereinafter ARBITRATION RULES]. But see NATONAL ASS'N OF SEC. DEALERS, A
CODE OF ARBrrRATON PROCEDURE 22-5 (1989) (providing for "information request" pro-
ceeding requiring neither prior approval of arbitrator(s) nor agreement of opponent, and re-
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cal proposal to retreat from the presently prevailing right to very broad
discovery,22 9 in which the court becomes involved only after disputes
arise.23° The requirement that parties in arbitration seek prior approval
of discovery requests bears more resemblance to the common law limita-
tions on discovery than to modem practice.231 Particularly restrictive is
the fact that arbitration discovery provisions typically provide only for
documentary exchanges, with no provision for interrogatories, deposi-
tions, or other discovery devices.232
Such limitations on discovery work to the disadvantage of the cus-
tomer. The customer bears the burden of proof, although the broker
usually has the larger quantity and variety of discoverable material.233
Thus, when commentators refer to the burden, expense, and inconven-
ience of discovery, they speak from the broker's perspective.234 The bro-
ker bears the greater burden under freer discovery, not only in the effort
quiring service on opponent of documents each party intends to use at the arbitration hearing
even without affirmative request).
Despite the urging in arbitration rules to cooperate in discovery and voluntarily exchange
documents, practice falls short of this ideal. "One failing of some brokerage firms in arbitra-
tion proceedings is to refuse to turn over documents unless ordered to do so by the panel [of
arbitrators]." D. ROBBINS, supra note 225, at 67. If brokers resist voluntary discovery ex-
changes, the limit of discovery becomes equal to the willingness of the arbitrator(s) to order
discovery. See Fletcher, supra note 61, at 453.
229. "While an arbitration panel may subpoena documents or witnesses, the litigating par-
ties have no comparable privilege." Burton v. Bush, 614 F.2d 389, 390 (4th Cir. 1980).
As to the extent of discovery in federal courts, see FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b); 8 C. WRIGHT &
A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL §§ 2007-2015 (1970 & Supp.
1990).
230. R. HAYDOCK & D. HERR, DISCOVERY: THEORY, PRACTICE AND PROBLEMS 2
(1983).
231. See Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Jenkins Petroleum Process Co., 289 U.S. 689 (1933); Com-
ment, Developments in the Law-Discovery, 74 HARV. L. REv. 940 (1961).
232. For a list of typical discovery provisions in arbitration, see supra note 228.
As to the necessity of other forms of discovery in securities disputes, it is possible that
other devices would be of limited usefulness. Presumably, a substantial portion of the evi-
dence, at least, will be documentary, and this form of discovery may be all that is required in
most cases. This is probably of little consolation to those who feel they need broader discovery
to present their case.
As to the advantages of depositions as a discovery device, see R. HAYDOCK & D. HERR,
supra note 230, at 87-88.
233. RESOLVING SECURITIES DISPUTES, supra note 2, at 66-69. The author suggests a list
of eight categories of information that the securities customer should request from the broker,
some of which may include relatively numerous documents (such as the suggested request for
all trading confirmations and monthly statements). Id at 67-68. The list of suggestions to
brokers includes only five items. Id at 68-69. None appears to call for extensive or burden-
some production, with the possible exception of the request for documents on trading activity
with other brokers (if investor sophistication is at issue). Id
234. This is all the more true since the customer may be required to set forth the entire
claim at the initial pleading stage. See infra notes 235-40 and accompanying text. Thus, the
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required to comply with discovery requests, but also in the potential im-
provement in the former customer's ability to present a case through dis-
covered data. It appears clear that the broker has little to gain and much
to lose through extensive discovery in most cases and, therefore, may
expect to gain in the long run from a general rule restricting discovery.
Undoubtedly, there may be cases in which more open discovery will
make no difference, or will make a difference for the worse through har-
assment, increased expense, and other potential abuses. Nevertheless, it
is difficult to conclude that this potential for abuse justifies wholesale re-
peal of discovery rights, particularly when it appears the customer con-
sistently is more likely to suffer from more restrictive discovery.
3. Prerequisites to initiating a claim
In court, a plaintiff may file suit even though not yet in possession of
sufficient facts or evidence to prove the case.235 Such hospitality toward
the right to pursue compensation is not necessarily shared by arbitration,
where rules may require a party to state all the facts they intend to rely
upon in the document initiating proceedings.
2 36
Arbitrators could allow a party to later amend the initial claim
forms so as to modify a claim to match the results of further investiga-
tion.2 37 However, this fails to correct the problem for two reasons. First,
amending the claim is discretionary, and the arbitrators may refuse to
allow expansion of a claim. 38 Second, and more importantly, arbitration
limitations on discovery 39 may prevent a customer from ever unearthing
the evidence necessary to give the customer a reason to require the ability
to amend.24  The unnecessary burden of arbitration rules requiring cus-
broker probably has little need for discovery; the broker already has all the information he
needs in the customer's initial pleading.
235. See, eg., FED. R. Civ. P. 10(b) (allows party to plead inconsistent, alternative, or
hypothetical facts, so that party may proceed with discovery and clarify claim later); see also
R. HAYDOCK & D. HERR, supra note 230, at 9-11 (stating that one purpose of discovery is to
substantiate claim with facts and evidence not available to the party otherwise).
236. See, eg., UNIF. CODE OF ARBrrRATION, § 612, reprinted in 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH)
2612 (Nov. 1989) (as adopted by the New York Stock Exchange).
237. See, e.g., ARBrrRATION RULES, supra note 228, at 7 (allowing changes in claim as a
right until an arbitrator is appointed, but only in arbitrators' discretion thereafter).
238. Idl
239. See supra notes 223-34 and accompanying text.
240. One commentator reverses this logic:
Investors are not disadvantaged by limited discovery because it is largely unnecessary
under the arbitration rules used by the securities exchanges. A claimant must, in the
initial statement of a claim, set out all the facts on which he intends to rely.... Any
facts [or] claims... left out ... may not be used at the hearing itself.... Thus, at
least with respect to arbitrations before the major securities exchanges, formal dis-
covery has become largely unnecessary.
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tomers to state their entire case at initial pleading stages, in tandem with
the limitations on discovery in arbitration after the initial pleading stage,
strike a double blow against the customer with a claim against a securi-
ties broker.
4. Arbitrator bias
Even if arbitration procedures are not sufficiently rigorous to pre-
vent unfairness from occurring within the bounds of the rules, the arbi-
tration system ultimately depends on the arbitrators themselves to make
the system function fairly.24' Can the customer expect arbitrators to be
fair and impartial? While the answer must ultimately depend on the per-
sons involved, an examination of the structure of the arbitral process and
the means of selecting arbitrators validates customer distrust of
arbitration.
A review of arbitration rules discloses two systems for selecting arbi-
trators. The first is the party-arbitrator system,242 and the second is ap-
pointment from a roster of potential arbitrators.243 Under either system,
a majority of the arbitrators must be from outside the securities
industry.
244
In the party-arbitrator system, each side chooses an arbitrator, and
the two sides agree24' on a third, neutral arbitrator. This system has
Fletcher, supra note 61, at 453-54.
This effort to justify one handicap the customer suffers by reference to another barrier
unique to arbitration is rather like the dieter who justifies overeating at dinner because he or
she overate at lunch, and hence was off the diet anyway.
241. Of course, there are obvious limits to the extent a dispute resolution system may rely
on the good faith and sense of justice of participants to make the system fair. Why bother
having any rules of procedure if the judges or arbitrators may be trusted to do justice
unerringly? Approaching the question from the opposite perspective, there appears to be no
serious argument that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are needed solely out of mistrust of
the federal judiciary to do justice. Rules define the parties' duties and rights, so all know what
to expect. This tends to increase the all-important perception of fairness in the system. See
supra notes 220-23 and accompanying text.
242. E.g., ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 228, at 10-11 (allowing each party to choose
an arbitrator, and directing the two selected party arbitrators to select a third, "neutral"
arbitrator).
243. E.g., id at 9-10 (American Arbitration Association (AAA) system of appointing arbi-
trators when arbitration agreement silent on the subject). When the SRO appoints arbitrators,
it may seek input from parties. See, eg., i Other SROs simply allow parties a right to
challenge a selected arbitrator. See, e.g., FIFrH REPORT OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY CON-
FERENCE ON ARBITRATION, supra note 198, at 121-22.
244. See, ag., ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 228, at 11.
245. The parties' counsel may deal with each other directly, or the party-arbitrators (at
least nominally) may select the neutral arbitrator. See id at 10-11.
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been used in international arbitrations24 and is common in other con-
texts as well.247 The party-arbitrator system has been criticized and is
generally disfavored by experts in alternative dispute resolution.248 It is
said to needlessly increase the expense of arbitration and complicate the
proceeding, while adding nothing to the value of the end product. There
is no requirement that party-arbitrators be neutral,249 and they may even
be openly recognized and tolerated as biased on the assumption that the
biases of the party-arbitrators will cancel each other out.250 If it is true
that the party-arbitrators merely cancel each other out, they apparently
add nothing to the dispute resolution process, and the neutral arbitrator
effectively decides the case.
The second method of choosing arbitrators, appointment from an
approved roster, does not solve arbitrator selection problems. To begin
with, the roster itself may be carefully selected to reflect partiality toward
the securities industry and its practices. From the standpoint of cus-
tomer perception, the problem is probably worse. Why would a cus-
tomer, who already feels so wronged by a professional in the securities
industry as to initiate legal action, entrust the New York Stock Ex-
change, Inc., the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., or any
other SRO to act impartially in a dispute between a dues-paying SRO
member (the broker) and an investor?251
246. Elsen, Evaluation of Self-Regulatory Organization Administration of Securities Dis-
putes, in RESOLVING SECuRrrlEs DispurEs, supra note 2, at 483 (presenting interim findings
and evaluation of "The Arbitration Project" of the American Bar Association Subcommittee
on Civil Liabilities and Litigation).
247. Substantial case law has developed around the use of arbitration agreements calling for
party-arbitrator tripartite arbitration between the Kaiser-Permanente organization, a large
health maintenance organization in California and Hawaii, and the member patients.
Werchick, Arbitration and Good Faith, 19 CTLA F. 319, 321-25 (1989).
248. See id.
249. See M. DOMKE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 20.03
(1968). This is not to suggest party-arbitrators may casually ignore the evidence:
Our decision that an arbitrator may not be disqualified solely because of a relation-
ship to his nominator or to the subject matter of a controversy does not, however,
mean that he may be deaf to the testimony or blind to the evidence presented. Parti-
san he may be, but not dishonest.
Astoria Medical Group v. Health Ins. Plan of Greater N.Y., 11 N.Y.2d 128, 137, 182 N.E.2d
85, 89, 227 N.Y.S.2d 401, 407 (1962).
250. See, eg., Tipton v. Systron Donner Corp., 99 Cal. App. 3d 501, 506, 160 Cal. Rptr.
303, 305 (1979) ("[The arbitrators representing the parties frequently behave more like advo-
cates than arbitrators. A special relationship between the non-neutral arbitrator and his client
is implicit in the tripartite format here freely adopted by the parties."). The court's choice of
words is particularly interesting, referring to a party as the "client" of the party-arbitrator.
251. At least three U.S. Supreme Court Justices have recognized current procedures, de-
spite SEC oversight, have corrected neither the perception nor the fact of arbitrator bias in
securities arbitration: "the investor has the impression, frequently justified, that his claims are
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Some commentators argue this suspicion is unfounded, because ar-
bitration agreements give the customer a choice of arbitral forums, in-
cluding the American Arbitration Association and other non-profit
organizations with no ties to the securities industry.252 This argument
confuses actual fairness253 with the perception of fairness.254 The argu-
ment is also flawed in its assumption that SROs not owned or operated
directly by the securities industry must ipso facto be completely fair to
customers.
It must be remembered that this whole issue arises from a broker
presenting to a customer an arbitration agreement before any dispute
arises. If the securities industry decided that arbitration was unwise, it
could simply stop offering customers such agreements.255 In contrast,
customers have no such power to halt the use of arbitration through their
opposition.256 Thus, assuming the SROs wish to stay in business, they
being judged by a forum composed of individuals sympathetic to the securities industry ..... "
Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 260). (Blackmun, J., dissenting
(1987)).
252. E.g., Fletcher, supra note 61, at 448-50.
253. Fletcher fails to discuss the more philosophical question involved in this distinction,
namely, how to analytically separate the concept of actual fairness fromperceived fairness. See
id. It is easy to imagine hypothetical cases in which the result would have only one of these
two. In considering whether a system is "fair," it becomes more difficult to imagine determin-
ing how a system operated in good faith could have one without the other. Logically, such a
determination would require a study from an unattainable, omniscient viewpoint to determine
who was "really" right, and compare this with how well the system correctly decided for the
"right" party. Such a view presumes an unrealistically black-and-white view of disputes; who
is "right" between a broker following usual business customs and a customer who loses large
sums out of misplaced trust in an unskillful (or unlucky) broker? The "right" answer appears
to arise more from one's sympathies in this David-and-Goliath struggle than from an objective
standard.
Fletcher argues at length against the perceptions of unfairness in the existing system,
listing "myths" about securities arbitration and attempting to demonstrate each is baseless.
IL at 455-58. He ignores his own conclusion later in the same article that the securities indus-
try needs investor confidence to survive, and that arbitration similarly requires public confi-
dence to work. Id, at 460.
254. See supra notes 220-23 and accompanying text.
255. Indeed, predispute arbitration agreements are not universal in the securities industry.
See Katsoris, supra note 3, at 2 n.4. No source has been found as to whether this is due to SEC
Rule 15c2-2, see supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text, the impression that arbitration
agreements are unenforceable pursuant to Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), or some other
reason. Obviously, the Rodriguez de Quifas case will lead to increased use of such agreements
now that there is no question of their enforceability, if it has any impact at all.
256. Customers frequently are unaware of the existence or significance of an arbitration
agreement when it is presented. See Richards v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
64 Cal. App. 3d 899, 135 Cal. Rptr. 26 (1977). It is therefore unrealistic to argue that custom-
ers can eliminate arbitration by refusing to sign the agreements. Moreover, brokers may de-
cline to do business with customers who refuse to agree to arbitration.
792 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:757
face a party with the power to make their existence obsolete 5 7 (the se-
curities industry) versus a party with essentially no control over the exist-
ence of arbitration agreements. Whether the SROs may be motivated by
a corrupt desire to service the securities industry or a benevolent belief in
the arbitral process, it remains difficult to suppose SROs do not prefer
self-preservation. It is also difficult to imagine that SROs fail to perceive
that their existence 8 depends on the continued good will of the securi-
ties industry.
259
The existence of bias becomes more probable as the parties become
more involved in the process of selecting arbitrators. When the parties
257. This may appear to be an empty threat, because customers enjoy a unilateral right to
compel arbitration through exchange rules even without an arbitration agreement. See supra
note 198 and accompanying text. The customer's ability to force arbitration even in the ab-
sence of an agreement exists through the rules of stock exchanges, whose rules are formed by
the securities industry. Katsoris, supra note 3, at 2 n.4. The solicitation of arbitration agree-
ments by the securities industry is also built from the securities industry's favor of arbitration.
If the industry came to disfavor arbitration, it could not only stop offering customers arbitra-
tion agreements, but could also change the rules of the exchanges within their control. Thus,
the securities industry possesses the power to remove securities disputes from SROs (or any
particular disfavored SRO) if the industry's attitude on arbitration were to shift.
258. This would at least be true for SROs providing a forum only for securities disputes,
such as the arbitration services provided by exchanges. It may be less literally true for forums
such as the AAA which provide arbitration services for a wider range of disputes. Even in
such instances, the desire to promote arbitration as an alternative means of dispute resolution,
paradoxically, can provide motivation that makes the process unfair. Arbitrators with a strong
belief in the process may lean toward favoring the side which, like the arbitrators, favors arbi-
tration and requires customers to sign the agreements which make arbitration possible on a
widespread basis. It would seem to ask much of frail human nature to expect arbitrators to be
completely unmoved where a customer has fought arbitration in the courts (perhaps, as with
the customers in Rodriguez de Quijas, all the way to the Supreme Court). Can arbitrators
avoid feeling this is an attack on their personal integrity?
The analysis offered in the text would conceivably be untrue for an arbitral forum in
which securities arbitration'is a trivial source of business. If the arbitrators in such a forum
were truly indifferent to whether the securities industry would continue to employ their serv-
ices, they would lack a reason to favor either side. If such a forum exists, the very fact that
makes it so impartial, i.e., that securities arbitrations are such a small part of its caseload,
makes it an insignificant exception.
259. It might also be argued that because arbitration is less expensive than litigation, the
securities industry would prefer arbitration even if the ultimate losses were the same as court
awards. This is true, but if the economic perspective is assumed to be the only reason for
choosing one forum over another, the whole economic picture must be reviewed. The securi-
ties industry is obviously aware of the time value of money concept, i.e., that it is less costly to
pay debts later so one can earn added interest on funds due to others, but held and invested.
From the purely economic perspective, the speed of arbitration is actually a disadvantage for
the party that claims are made against. The lower cost of arbitration must be weighed against
the time value of the money involved to choose one system over the other from a financial
viewpoint. The literature in this area speaks much of the lower cost of arbitration, see, e.g.,
Fletcher, supra note 61, at 397, but no source was found that quantifies the difference. Thus,
no general conclusion balancing these competing pecuniary factors is possible.
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affirmatively must agree on arbitrators, each side will wish to choose an
arbitrator favorable to its own position.26°
Counsel for the broker may have an edge in this process, because
such an attorney will probably have greater experience with the process
and more familiarity with the arbitrators available.2 61 Arbitrators may
not view the party who repeatedly brings cases before a particular forum
the same as a nonrepeat party, the customer. The arbitrators chosen
presumably will be aware that the broker's counsel is likely to be in-
volved in choosing arbitrators again on other cases, perhaps quite soon.
They also are likely to realize that most (if not all) attorneys for custom-
ers probably have no such power. The arbitrator, therefore, will proceed
with the knowledge that the "wrong" decision could mean that he or she
will never again have the opportunity to sit as an arbitrator.262 Even
assuming an individual arbitrator is actually uninfluenced by such con-
siderations, the customer may remain justifiably suspicious of the
process.
Moreover, arbitrator selection problems are not the only bias issue.
Even if the selection process had no independent problems, the rules of
arbitration call for a built-in bias on the arbitration panel by requiring
panels to be composed of two "public" arbitrators (allegedly without ties
to the securities industry), and one arbitrator from the securities indus-
try.2 63  Courts have been troubled by the prospect of asking an arbitrator
to fairly decide a matter involving the industry upon which the arbitrator
260. There appears to be no reason to suppose that advocates for each side would view
arbitrator selection any differently than jury selection. It is well recognized that voir dire is not
used to select the most unbiased jury possible. See J. JEANs, TRIAL ADVOCACY § 7.7 (1975).
Each side wants the jurors perceived as most inclined towards that party's case. Id.
261. See Werchick, supra note 247, at 322.
262. See Id. This is a concept quite similar to the pressure on the arbitration process as a
whole. See supra notes 251-59 and accompanying text. The point here is that the individual
arbitrators suffer from a comparable pressure at each and every arbitration. The very fact that
arbitration is a voluntary process, chosen by the securities industry over customer objection,
implies that the industry could also choose not to arbitrate.
263. See, eg., ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 228, at 9. As to whether such industry
arbitrators are disinterested, it has been suggested that such panelists are actually harder on
fellow brokers out of a desire to maintain the public image of the industry. See D. RoBBINS,
supra note 225, at 89. Most commentators perceive arbitrators from the industry as presenting
a significant conflict of interest. See, eg., Exchange Act Release No. 13,470, [1977-1978
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 81,136, at 87,906 (Apr. 26, 1977).
The Arbitration Project of the American Bar Association Subcommittee on Civil Liabili-
ties and Litigation specifically found "that industry arbitrators inevitably have business rela-
tions with the [brokerage] house which is involved in the arbitration" and that "[i]ndustry
arbitrators frequently engage in the same practices that are challenged in an arbitration and, as
such, have difficulty in being even moderately impartial." Elsen, supra note 246, at 483.
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depends for a livelihood.2
Proponents of arbitration argue this is an advantage because it pro-
vides the panel with the necessary expertise.265 This suggestion is quite
radical2 66 when examined for what it is-deciding a case in significant
part based on a witness who is sequestered with the triers of the matter,
whose testimony on expert subjects goes to the heart of the case, but
whose testimony is never even heard by the parties, let alone subjected to
cross-examination.
Nevertheless, arbitration proponents deny that the presence of an
industry arbitrator is a problem because the lone industry arbitrator
would always be in a minority.267 This argument fails for two reasons.
First, the expertise of the industry arbitrator places that arbitrator in
a position of influence over the othqr two arbitrators, and the industry
arbitrator need only persuade one fellow arbitrator in order to carry the
day for the securities industry.268
Second, "industry arbitrator" is a term that is either undefined or
defined in a way that does not include all those whose relationship to the
securities industry would give them at least the appearance of bias.269
264. In American Safety Equip. Corp. v. JP. McGuire & Co., the court reversed an order to
arbitrate on the grounds, inter alia, that commercial arbitrators, usually businessmen them-
selves, could not be called on to implement policies designed to regulate the business commu-
nity. 391 F.2d 821, 827-28 (2d Cir. 1968).
The court went even further in Hope v. Superior Court, where the court held a predispute
arbitration agreement with a customer unconscionable because it allowed arbitration before
the New York Stock Exchange. 122 Cal. App. 3d 147, 154, 175 Cal. Rptr. 851, 852-53 (1981).
The court found that the New York Stock Exchange "is presumptively biased in favor of
[securities industry] management" and "that there exists a presumptive institutional bias in
favor of member firms and members.... ." Id.
265. See, e.g., Masucci & Morris, Securities Arbitration at Self-Regulatory Organizations:
Administration and Procedures, in RESOLVING SECURrnEs DIsPUTES, supra note 2, at 251;
Robbins, supra note 225, at 52.
266. It is, of course, the norm in court cases that the decision is based on evidence adduced
during trial, and neither a juror's general knowledge pertaining to a dispute nor any expertise a
juror may have about the subject matter of the litigation should be allowed to interfere with
the decision-making process. See, e.g., Edelstein v. Roskin, 356 So. 2d 38 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1978); Downing v. Farmers' Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 158 Iowa 1, 138 N.W. 917 (1912). But see
Solberg v. Robbins Lumber Co., 147 Wis. 259, 133 N.W. 29 (1911) (approving jury instruction
that jurors may pool their expertise to help them decide a case).
267. See, eg., Fletcher, supra note 61, at 449-50.
268. See Elsen, supra note 246, at 483.
269. The AAA rules, for example, specify that one of the three arbitrators (the usual
number unless the matter is a small claim) shall be "affiliated with the securities industry."
ARBITRATioN RULES, supra note 228, at 9. The rules contain no definition of what degree of
relationship amounts to "affiliation," a failing common to SRO arbitration rules. Brown, Shell
& Tyson, Arbitration of Customer-Broker Disputes Arising Under the Federal Securities Laws
and RICO, 15 SEc. REG. L.J. 3, 35 n.94 (1987); Katsoris, The Arbitration of a Public Securities
Dispute, 53 FORDHAM L. Rv. 279, 309-12 (1984).
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Justice Blackmun observed in McMahon that "[a]ccordingly, it is often
possible for the 'public' arbitrators to be attorneys or consultants whose
clients have been exchange members or SROs. 2 7 ° The few SRO rules
which attempt to define an "industry arbitrator" exclude only the most
obvious conflicts, leaving many suspect categories to be public
arbitrators.271
Whether securities arbitration as it presently exists is actually fair is
probably a philosophical question that cannot be answered.272 It is
human nature that many losing parties will feel the adverse outcome
could only be explained by arbitrator bias. As to the critical appearance
of impropriety, however, it is clear present practices leave much room for
public skepticism on the impartiality of arbitrators.
This Note next examines whether judicial review of arbitrators' de-
cisions is a sufficient safeguard to neutralize any arbitrator bias.
5. Judicial review to counteract problems with arbitration
After an arbitration award is rendered, the litigating parties may
return to court to confirm the award and to have judgment entered ac-
cordingly.2 73 The court may vacate the award, but only on the very nar-
row grounds that: (1) "the award was procured through corruption,
fraud, or undue means"274 ; (2) "there was evident partiality or corrup-
270. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 261 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting).
271. See, eg., Masucci & Morris, supra note 265, at 238. The authors offer a typical
definition:
No one may serve as a public arbitrator who has been an employee or partner of a
member organization or subsidiary thereof, or a shareholder of a non-publicly owned
member organization or subsidiary thereof for a period of three years immediately
preceding his or her appointment as a public arbitrator.
Id
This definition fails to exclude the types of arbitrator listed by Justice Blackmun, see
supra note 270 and accompanying text. Further, it fails to exclude spouses, retirees (retired
over three years), and others whose positions or relations to the industry may suggest a conflict
of interest.
Conversely, the National Association of Securities Dealers uses a fairly good definition:
An arbitrator will be deemed as being from the securities industry if he or she:
(1) is a person associated with a member or other broker/dealer, municipal
securities dealer, government securities broker, or government securities dealer, or
(2) has been associated with any of the above within the past three (3) years, or
(3) is retired from any of the above, or
(4) is an attorney, accountant, or other professional who has devoted twenty
(20) percent or more of his or her professional work effort to securities industry
clients within the last two years.
NATIONAL AW5'N OF SEC. DEALERS, supra note 228, at 13 (1989).
272. See supra notes 220-23 and accompanying text.
273. 9 U.S.C. §§ 9-13 (1988).
274. Id § 10(a).
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tion in the arbitrators, or either of them"2 75 ; (3) the arbitrators were
guilty of misconduct or misbehavior;276 (4) the arbitrators "exceeded
their powers, or so imperfectly executed them" that no final award could
be made;27 7 or (5) consistent with the ground developed in case law, the
arbitrators acted with "manifest disregard" for the law.27 8
Certainly, the advantage of the speed of arbitration would be lost if
the court, on motion to confirm the award, had full power to review the
matter on the merits. 279 The Rodriguez de Quias Court, through its
adoption of the McMahon discussion of arbitration, viewed limited re-
view as sufficient.2 0 An examination of the restrictive review powers of
the court in deciding a motion to confirm an arbitration award reveals
that broader review of the arbitrators' award is necessary but not gener-
ally obtainable.
Wider powers to review arbitration awards are necessary to protect
the customer's statutory rights. The Rodriguez de Quias Court thought
that arbitration would not diminish customer rights under securities laws
because an agreement to arbitrate would not surrender any substantive
rights, but would act merely as a selection of an alternative forum for
adjudication of those rights.281 In adopting this position, the Court over-
looked a strong line of decisions holding that arbitrators are not bound to
decide in accordance with the law.282 Even more pertinent to the ques-
275. Id § 10(b).
276. IdL § 10(c).
277. Id § 10(d).
278. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953); Fairchild & Co. v. Richmond, F. &
P.R.R., 516 F. Supp. 1305, 1315 (D.D.C. 1981). As the Wilko Court noted, however, it is
necessary to distinguish between faulty interpretation of the law and manifest disregard.
Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436-37. This standard of review prevents courts from serving as a route of
appeal from an award based on a simple error of law. As the Fairchild court noted, manifest
disregard requires that the arbitrator correctly state the law, and disregard it nevertheless.
Fairchild, 516 F. Supp. at 1315; accord Sobel v. Hertz, Warner & Co., 469 F.2d 1211, 1214 (2d
Cir. 1972); San Martine Compania de Navegacion v. Saguenay Terminals, 293 F.2d 796, 801
(9th Cir. 1961).
279. R. COULSON, Busnass ARBrrRATON - WHAT You NEED TO KNow 10 (3d ed.
1987).
280. Rodriguez de Quijas, 109 S. Ct. 1920-21 (1989). The McMahon Court had said that
"although judicial scrutiny of arbitration awards necessarily is limited, such review is sufficient
to ensure that arbitrators comply with the requirements of the statute." McMahon, 482 U.S.
at 231.
281. Rodriguez de Qu~ias, 109 S. Ct. at 1920. "'By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a
party does not forego the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their
resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum."' Id (quoting Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth; 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
282. This principle was well settled in New York at an early date. See S.A. Wenger & Co.
v. Propper Silk Hosiery Mills, 239 N.Y. 199, 203, 146 N.E. 203, 204 (1924). More recently, a
California court termed the principle "well established" and expanded it into a new area.
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tion of whether arbitrators do, in practice, follow the law is the fact that
arbitrators generally do not believe they are bound by the law, but rather
that they are bound only to do what they think is fair.283 Obviously,
what a particular panel of arbitrators feels is fair will not necessarily cor-
respond with a customer's rights under securities laws.2" The Rodriguez
de Quias majority rejected the argument that arbitration could be a ruse
to avoid these customer rights granted in the securities laws.2"' Never-
theless, it appears that arbitration may deny customer rights absent judi-
cial oversight to correct mistakes and abuses. Does the present system
permit such oversight?
Despite the FAA's limitations on review,286 there is no reason to
suppose courts are reluctant to overturn arbitration awards based on a
clear denial of customer rights as guaranteed under the securities laws.
The problem with existing procedures is that they fail to ensure that the
court will have an opportunity to assess the arbitration. For example,
arbitration rules generally do not provide for a transcript of proceedings
unless one is requested and paid for by the parties.2 7 Hence, the cus-
tomer who proceeds confidently to arbitration, and sees no need to pay
for a costly record, may find no way to substantiate a later claim in court
that the award should be overturned.288
Nogueiro v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 203 Cal. App. 3d 1192, 1194-95, 250 Cal. Rptr. 478, 479
(1988).
283. See Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 846, 860-62 (1961).
The author surveyed the American Arbitration Association arbitrator panel, and found that
although 80% believed they ought to follow substantive law, 90% felt free to disregard sub-
stantive law mandates if they desired. IdL at 861.
284. This is particularly true because at least one of the arbitrators will be from the securi-
ties industry, and may be sympathetic towards a broker who takes a shortcut around the
securities law protection guaranteed the customer. See supra notes 242-44 and accompanying
text.
285. Rodriguez de Quijas, 109 S. Ct. at 1920.
286. See supra notes 273-77 and accompanying text.
287. See, eg., ARBrrRATON RULES, supra note 228, at 12. Essentially, the rules merely
grant all parties the right to have a stenographer present at the hearing, at the party's own
expense. Id
But see NATIONAL ASS'N OF SEC. DEALERS, supra note 228, at 26 (requiring either a
stenographic or tape recorded verbatim record of arbitration hearings, the only expense being
transcription costs split between any parties requesting the transcribed record).
288. Arguably, because a customer has the right to have a record transcribed, there is no
injustice in denying relief because a customer chooses to forego the record. This argument is
based on the flawed assumption that it is just to penalize persons with just positions when they
fail to have foresight of acuity equal to hindsight. Why would a customer with a strong case
and faith in the fairness of arbitration diminish full recovery by the expense of having a stenog-
rapher present throughout the arbitration hearing? The stronger the case, the more likely it is
that a customer will elect to forego a transcript as an unnecessary expense. However, these
customers have a greater need for judicial review in the event of an arbitration loss, because it
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A full transcript of proceedings is not the only material a court
might profitably review to determine if an award should be overturned.
A written opinion from the arbitrators summarizing the evidence, find-
ings of fact, legal conclusions, and rationale could be more useful than a
transcript.289 Just as formal arbitration rules inhibit parties from ob-
taining a transcript, informal. arbitration practice inhibits arbitrators
from drafting opinions. 2" Not only is there generally no requirement
that arbitrators give written opinions justifying their decision,29 arbitra-
tors are actively discouraged from rendering written opinions.2 92 The
President of the AAA has advised arbitrators that "[w]ritten opinions
can be dangerous because they identify targets for the losing party to
attack." '293 Thus, the losing party at arbitration has no guarantee that
even the very limited grounds for overturning an award will actually be
available in a later court hearing beca7ise the rules and customs of arbi-
tration act to suppress evidence that might upset an award.29 4 As a re-
sult, the courts are rendered impotent to rectify denials of customer
rights at the hands of arbitration.295
is more likely that an injustice was done. It would therefore seem that transcripts are needed
most when they are least likely to be seen as a worthwhile investment.
289. Especially after a lengthy arbitration, it could be an onerous task for a court to sift
through hundreds or thousands of pages of transcript. Having done so, the court might find
no convincing evidence of whether the arbitrators were corrupt, acted in disregard of the law,
or otherwise conducted themselves in a way justifying reversal of the award. Conversely, a
relatively brief opinion may reveal the basis for overturning an improper award. Particularly if
the arbitrators' statement of applicable law is compared to a brief submitted by the customer,
disregard of the law otherwise hidden could become manifest. See Fletcher, supra note 61, at
454-55 (parties' briefs may help make disregard of law manifest).
290. See SEcuRrTES INDUS. CONF. ON ARBITRATION, ARBrrRATION PROCEDURES 16
(1989) [hereinafter ARBITRATION PROCEDURES] (decision is based solely on material provided
by parties); see also United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598
(1960) (arbitrators need not explain basis of award); M. DOMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
§ 29:06, at 435-36 (rev. ed. 1984) (arbitrators not required to write opinions).
291. See ARBrrRATION PROCEDURES, supra note 290, at 16.
292. Id.
293. R. CouisoN, supra note 279, at 20 -21.
294. Id. One commentator cogently observes that arbitration as we know it requires this
state of affairs. See Sterk, supra note 99, at 484-85. If arbitrators are required to follow the
law, make full records of proceedings, and issue formal opinions with findings of fact, all sub-
ject to appellate scrutiny, arbitration will have come essentially full circle to imitate the court
system. Id
295. The customer's problems are illustrated by the customer who submitted his dispute to
arbitration in Sobel v. Hertz, Warner & Co., 338 F. Supp. 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd, 469
F.2d 1211 (2d Cir. 1972). The customer alleged market manipulation and fraud. Id. at 289-
92. Arbitrators dismissed without elaboration, after one of the brokerage house employees was
convicted of criminal charges in connection with the same activity. Id. at 290-92. The district
court remanded the matter to the arbitrators for an explanation of the basis for the dismissal.
Id at 297. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the order, holding arbitrators had
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6. SEC oversight
The Rodriguez de Quijas majority touted the power granted the SEC
in 1975296 to regulate arbitration as safeguarding customers' rights under
securities laws.2 97 The majority's faith in the SEC may be misplaced for
three reasons.
First, the SEC's oversight is limited to procedural rules affecting ar-
bitrations as a whole and gives the SEC no power to review or reverse an
individual case no matter how unfair the result.2 98 The SEC is impotent
to correct indefensible arbitration results, except through rule modifica-
tions designed to prevent recurrences in future arbitrations. Indeed, SEC
policy is to inform complaining customers (even before arbitration) that
the SEC "may not interpose itself between private parties in their
disputes."2 99
Second, it is questionable whether the SEC's limited resources allow
for effective regulation, particularly in light of the burdens imposed by
growth in the securities marketplace."c°
Third, the SEC's oversight has, in fact, left much room for improve-
ment. 301 As noted above,3 2 a customer seeking recovery from a broker
still faces numerous unresolved procedural hurdles.3"3 Industry SROs
no duty to explain their actions. Sobel v. Hertz, Warner & Co., 469 F.2d 1211, 1215-16 (2d
Cir. 1972).
296. See 15, 15A, 19, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f, 78o, 78s (1983).
297. Rodriguez de Quias, 109 S. Ct. at 1921 (citing with approval Shearson/American Ex-
press v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 231-34 (1987)).
298. The McMahon minority observed:
The [SEC] does not pretend that its oversight consists of anything other than a gen-
eral review of SRO rules and the ability to require that an SRO adopt or delete a
particular rule. It does not contend that its "sweeping authority".. . includes a
review of specific arbitration proceedings. It thus neither polices nor monitors the
results of these arbitrations for possible misapplications of securities laws or for indi-
cations of how investors fare in these proceedings.
McMahon, 482 U.S. at 265 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting).
299. Fitterman, supra note 92, at 209 (comments of Mark 0. Fitterman, Associate Direc-
tor, Office of Inspections and Financial Responsibility, Division of Market Regulation, SEC
Washington, D.C., office).
300. See Oversight, Authorization, and Other Matters: Hearings on H.R. 1602 Before the
Subcomm. on Telecommunications Consumer Protection, and Finance, 99th cong., 1st Sess.
(1986).
301. Even proponents of arbitration agree that the system needs improved procedures. See,
e.g., Katsoris, supra note 3, at 9-15.
302. See supra notes 224-40 and accompanying text.
303. This is not to say the SEC has been totally dormant. To the contrary, the SEC itself
realized its oversight had been inadequate after Justice Blackmun's criticism and skepticism of
the SEC's activity in this area expressed in McMahon, 482 U.S. at 261-66 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring and dissenting). The most significant changes in arbitration practice, however,
have come from the industry itself. For example, in 1989, the Securities Industry Conference
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are still perceived as biased, and attorneys for customers are still calling
for improvements in the system.3°
The SEC's oversight of SRO arbitration procedural rules has un-
doubtedly improved arbitration practices, and it has made rules more
uniform between SROs.305 Nonetheless, expecting such limited oversight
to ensure justice in securities arbitration seems wildly optimistic.
7. Conclusion: the present system of securities arbitration is a
seriously flawed alternative to dispute resolution
in the courts
It is clear that the present practices of securities arbitration has
many flaws. These practices justify the perception, at least, that the sys-
tem is designed to unfairly circumvent the customer's rights under the
securities laws by forcing the customer into a forum where those rights
may be disregarded and the right to appeal is restricted to the point of
impotence.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
The Rodriguez de Quias v. Shearson/American Express"° case has
completed an historical shift in the law: from the anti-arbitration posi-
tions of Wilko v. Swan a°7 and the SEC rule forbidding brokers and deal-
ers from entering agreements with customers308 to the elimination of
legal barriers to arbitration and the enforcement of predispute arbitration
agreements.30 9 If unresolved legal questions prior to Rodriguez de Quias
hindered the more widespread use of arbitration agreements, such agree-
ments are likely to become more common in the wake of the Rodriguez
de Quijas decision. An increased use of arbitration adds urgency to the
process of reforming arbitration practices because wider use of arbitra-
tion could effect a repeal of protections guaranteed investors since the
on Arbitration, an industry organization formed to frame uniform arbitration rules between
the SROs, required highlighting predispute arbitration clauses so that they could no longer be
buried in fine print. Metropolitan News-Enterprise (Los Angeles), Jan. 24, 1990, at 11.
304. Metropolitan News-Enterprise, supra note 303, at 11 (noting, inter alia, comments of
Theodore Eppenstein, counsel for the customers in McMahon, advocating changes in present
arbitration practice).
305. See FIFTH REPORT OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION,
supra note 198, at 110-11.
306. 109 S. Ct. 1917 (1989).
307. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
308. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-2(a) (1986).
309. Rodriguez de Qujias, 109 S. Ct. at 1921.
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Great Depression if arbitration fails to safeguard those rights as effec-
tively as the courts.
This Note proposes the following four changes to address weak-
nesses in the present practice. First, the burden of proof should be
shifted to the broker to show that the arbitration agreement was know-
ingly and voluntarily reached.31 0 Second, discovery should be allowed as
a matter of right.31' Third, arbitrators should be free from securities in-
dustry ties.312 Finally, arbitrators should be required to render writte'
opinions conforming to specified standards.31 3
A. Shifting the Burden of Proof to the Broker
Reform of securities arbitration should begin where arbitration has
its genesis, the initial agreement to arbitrate. The Wilko v. Swan 314 ma-
jority was clearly concerned with this issue,31 5 although the explicit
grounds for the decision ultimately rested elsewhere. 316 The Wilko
Court's explicit reasoning that the Securities Act voids all attempted
waivers of the customer's right to a judicial forum cannot be applied lit-
erally, however, as it would require absurd results in many situations.317
310. See infra notes 314-32 and accompanying text.
311. See infra notes 333-37 and accompanying text.
312. See infra notes 338-44 and accompanying text.
313. See infra notes 345-46 and accompanying text.
314. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
315. Ma at 432, 435-37. This issue is discussed at length in Lindsay, supra note 79, at 664-
69. That commentator considered the whole discussion of voluntariness to be superfluous in
light of the Court's holding that the Securities Act prohibited customer waivers of judicial
forums, thus providing an implied exception to the FAA. Id. at 664-65. The Wilko Court's
discussion of voluntariness is better seen as the true basis of the decision. The statutory argu-
ment was merely a formal attempt to avoid usurping the legislative function through establish-
ing a judge-made exception to the FAA, since the FAA states that exceptions are to be found
only in congressional pronouncements. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 3-4 (1988).
316. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 348 (congressional intent underlying Securities Act is better carried
out by invalidating arbitration agreement).
317. For example, if a customer cannot waive the judicial forum, even by a voluntary act,
why can a customer do so after initiating litigation? Clearly, courts are not disturbed by arbi-
tration agreements in this context. See supra note 4.
Likewise, how can securities cases be settled short of trial? The customer's dismissal of
litigation, surely a part of nearly every settlement, is clearly a waiver of the right to proceed to
trial. Here again, the law is contrary to what the Vilko reasoning might suggest, favoring
settlements even though the customer waives the right to proceed in a judicial forum. See
Lindsay, supra note 79, at 647. The reason securities laws permit settlement despite Wilko is
that "Congress did not take away from the citizen 'his inalienable right to make a fool of
himself.' It simply attempted to prevent others from making a fool of him." L. Loss, SEcuR-
TIES REGULATION 36 (1983) 1028-34 (1988).
The distinction between these situations and Wilko rests in the voluntariness and know-
ing nature of these situations. In each, the customer is acutely aware of the real possibility of
litigation and the need to protect the customer's own interests, but voluntarily chooses a
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The more rational application of the Wilko rule is for the courts to refuse
to enforce arbitration agreements whenever enforcement would be incon-
sistent with the purposes of the securities laws, to protect the customer
from broker overreaching and place the customer on equal footing with
the broker.318
This approach, when applied to refuse enforcement of predispute
arbitration agreements, is consistent with the spirit of the FAA,319 but
goes beyond the protections of the FAA alone. Predispute arbitration
agreements are presented to the customer at a moment when a decision
to invest has been made and the customer has decided to repose trust in a
given broker to handle the investment. This is a time in the sales transac-
tion when the customer is most vulnerable, 320 and least likely to notice
that papers being signed include an arbitration agreement. 321 Even if the
customer notices the arbitration agreement without benefit of counsel,
the customer probably has little understanding of the nature and impact
of the agreement.322
The problem with arbitration agreements in this context is not that
they are unenforceable contracts of adhesion in the traditional sense. 23
Rather, the problem is that such agreements are presented to the cus-
tomer at a point in the investment process when the customer is least
likely to appreciate the existence and meaning of the agreement.
The solution to this problem is to require the broker bringing a mo-
tion to compel arbitration to shoulder the burden of proof in resolving
course. In the situation where the customer is presented with an arbitration agreement at the
outset (perhaps along with, or as a part of, many other documents), it is unlikely as a matter of
common sense that the customer is concerned with litigation against the broker. Moreover, it
is less likely the customer knows the implications of agreeing to arbitrate, and the customer
may believe he or she is merely engaging in a formality without realizing that he or she is
agreeing to arbitrate.
318. Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 243 (1987) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring and dissenting); Wilko, 346 U.S. at 435-36.
319. The FAA would void arbitration agreements when they are unconscionable contracts
of adhesion such as would ordinarily void contracts of any sort. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1970).
320. R. DAWSON, You CAN GET ANYTHING You WANT - BUT You HAVE TO Asy. 6
(1985).
321. See D. ROBBINS, supra note 225, at 97.
322. Even the businessperson-investor, generally familiar with arbitration but lacking spe-
cific familiarity with securities industry arbitration practices, is not likely to know that the
arbitration agreement may benefit only the broker, since the customer would ordinarily be able
to force the broker into arbitration, if desired, regardless of whether the customer signs the
arbitration agreement. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
323. Traditionally, a contract of adhesion is an agreement forced on a party of lesser bar-
gaining power, who is left with the choices of adhering to the contract or rejecting it. See, e.g.,
Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 28 Cal. 3d 807, 818, 623 P.2d 165, 171-72, 171 Cal. Rptr. 604,
610-11 (1981).
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whether the arbitration. agreement was knowingly and voluntarily
signed.324 "The public policy involved when one party is in a position to
impose an arbitration clause on the other is a basic one: No one should
be deprived of access to the courts unless that party has satisfactorily
demonstrated a willingness to give up such access."32 This approach is
consistent with other securities laws that shift the burden of proof to
benefit the customer.326
The broker might satisfy this burden in a number of ways. That the
arbitration agreement was on a separate form and clearly titled, rather
than buried in fine print, would certainly carry some evidentiary value.327
The arbitration agreement could be accompanied by a standardized
warning in bold type and simple language, informing the customer that
the agreement waives the right to go to court if a dispute arises.3 28 The
warning should also inform the customer that the broker may be forced
into arbitration regardless of the existence of the arbitration agreement
for purchases through major exchanges.329
Apart from using a clear form for the agreement, the broker may
prove the customer was a sophisticated investor, who knew the implica-
tions of the arbitration agreement. A similar proposal was advanced
before Rodriguez de Quyias as an exception to the then-viable Wilko
rule.3
30
324. Sterk discusses a similar proposal, that the legal presumption be reversed, but would
give the presumption such force as to render this class of disputes non-arbitrable. See Sterk,
supra note 99, at 517-19.
325. Id at 518.
326. For example, the Securities Act shifts the burden of proof to the broker accused of
making untrue or misleading statements, to prove his lack of scienter, rather than forcing the
customer to prove the broker knew of the untrue or misleading nature of the statements. See
15 U.S.C. § 771 (1981).
327. At least two commentators have suggested that a separate agreement to arbitrate
should be the industry norm. See Elsen, supra note 246, at 486; D. ROBBINs, supra note 225,
at 97. Such is the norm in commodities trading. See 17 C.F.R. § 180.3 (1990).
328. This approach is taken by statute in California, for example, when a health care pro-
vider offers an agreement to arbitrate to patients. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1295 (West 1982).
The law calls for a warning in large, red print immediately before the signature space. Id.
Trading in commodities is similarly regulated to require an extensive, boldly printed warning.
See 17 C.F.R. § 180.3.
329. It may be asked why anyone would sign an agreement if informed that the agreement,
in effect, is for the broker's benefit. A customer may elect to sign knowing that some transac-
tions planned would fall outside major exchanges, or otherwise may not be arbitrable absent an
agreement. If customers begin routinely refusing arbitration, this is hardly a reason to with-
hold truthful full disclosure. Indeed, should the securities industry argue that information
must be withheld because otherwise no one would agree to arbitrate, the industry would im-
plicitly admit that arbitration is such an unfair arrangement that informed customers would
not agree to it.
330. See Fletcher, supra note 61, at 427-31.
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Many potential problems with securities arbitration are cast in a
new light when the customer entered into the arbitration agreement with
open eyes. If the customer who freely agreed to arbitration decides the
process was unfair upon seeing the result, this reaction seems no more
than a losing litigant's "sour grapes," the same as might have occurred
after losing a jury trial. The reaction no longer arouses a sense of injus-
tice that calls for changing the system of arbitration.
Any system of resolving securities disputes, however, has implica-
tions for the marketplace beyond the immediate litigants. The perform-
ance of the overall system for the resolution of securities disputes may
influence the public's faith on which the securities industry depends.331
It is not sufficient to ensure that the customer enters into arbitration
knowingly and freely. The system must also work.332 This Note will
next turn to improvements in the arbitral process itself.
B. Allowing Discovery as a Matter of Right
The customer should not be at the mercy of arbitrators for access to
information needed to prove a valid claim. Parties to an arbitration
should have rights to self-executing discovery, subject to the opposing
party's right to seek relief from abuses from the arbitrator(s).
Because arbitration is somewhat less adversarial in nature than liti-
gation 333 a party is likely to be ill-advised to proceed as if fighting a
battle of attrition.334 The party seeking unreasonable, burdensome dis-
covery, the true purpose of which is clearly to wear down the oppo-
nent,335 will be called to explain that conduct before the same arbitrators
who will ultimately decide the case.336 It appears less likely, therefore,
that discovery rights will be more abused in arbitration than in
litigation.337
331. See Sterk, supra note 99, at 519.
332. "So long as arbitration is not compulsory, but is based instead on the consent of the
parties, parties will only consent to arbitrate if they have faith in the arbitral process." Id. at
484 n.9. The more free and informed the customer's decision on arbitration is, the more the
system depends on the public's perception of fairness. Id. There may be little sense of outrage
inspired by a customer who loses arbitration, even unfairly, when the customer entered the
arrangement with open eyes; however, when the system itself is perceived as unfair, in the long
run, it cannot survive. Katsoris, supra note 3, at 15.
333. See D. RoBBINS, supra note 225, at 66 (arbitration seen as an expeditious, cost-effec-
tive alternative to court).
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id. at 67.
337. Id. Robbins noted, with regard to uncooperative tactics in arbitration discovery:
'This inevitably backfires because the last thing an arbitration panel wants to do is to take time
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C. Selecting Arbitrators Free of Industry Ties
Expert witnesses may play a very special role in resolving dis-
putes.338 Because advocates must carefully select experts, it is inappro-
priate to delegate this function to the SROs method of selecting the
industry arbitrator.339 While advocates may select "hired gun" experts
whose opinions are more influenced by their fees than their beliefs, this
does not imply that there is only one right answer to every expert ques-
tion. In many cases requiring expert testimony, parties will call expert
witnesses who disagree in good faith. The choice of an expert in support
of a client's position is a legitimate function of advocacy,34' and it is
unfair that an expert should be selected by the SRO, solely because he or
she has agreed to serve as an industry arbitrator, and then sequestered
with the arbitrators during deliberations.341 It is no answer that a party
may still bring in an expert; parties are encouraged to rely on the indus-
try arbitrator to inform the panel of industry practices. 342 Even the party
who brings an expert cannot hope a hired expert witness will be as influ-
ential as the "neutral" industry arbitrator.
Because industry practices may not be controversial in many cases,
there is no need to prohibit industry arbitrators familiar with the stan-
dards relevant in a particular dispute. There should be a right to de-
mand, however, that the industry arbitrator have no particularized
expertise in the subjects at issue. An arbitrator with such knowledge
might be perceived as an expert who may unduely inrfluence the other
arbitrators.
As to the non-industry arbitrators, there should be defined stan-
away from their busy days and attend a non-substantive hearing on document production."
Id.
338. See J. JEANS, supra note 260, §§ 12.1-12.9.
339. D. ROBBINS, supra note 225, at 27, noted that the public perceives SRO arbitration
panels to be more partial to the broker-dealer in a dispute, because that broker-dealer is a
member of that SRO and at least one arbitrator is from a member organization.
340. J. JEANS, supra note 260, § 12.8.
341. Sometimes, there is more than one correct approach to a professional question, such as
the judgment as to what type of investment is appropriate to a given investor's circumstances.
Professional liability may be established only by showing the professional's conduct was not
within any accepted approach. See, &g., W.P. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, D. OWEN,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTs § 32 (5th ed. 1984); CALIFORNIA JURY IN-
STRUCTIONS---CIVIL CALJIC 6.03 (7th ed. 1986).
There appears to be no justification for secreting away with the arbitrators a proponent of
one point of view on a disputed issue of expert testimony. Of course, the current practice may
favor either side. The point is not that this practice favors the broker, but that by deciding
arbitrations based on the view of the industry arbitrator rather than on the evidence it in-
troduces an almost random element.
342. See Masucci & Morris, supra note 265, at 251.
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dards for this category that exclude all whose backgrounds might con-
tribute to the appearance of partiality.343 Impartial, non-industry
arbitrators should be actively sought. They may include retired judges,
retired SEC personnel, professors, and other disinterested persons.'"
D. Establishing Standards for Written Opinions
If all else fails, the customer should not be deprived of court relief
for lack of ability to prove what occurred in arbitration or why the arbi-
trators decided as they did. The SROs should develop standards for the
content of the award, including a statement of the issues, the legal points
found relevant, the arbitrators' resolution of each issue, and at least a
brief reference to supporting evidence.
This requirement need not be unduly burdensome to the arbitrators.
Some SROs already provide a fill-in-the-blank form for awards,3 45 and it
would seem quite feasible to expand on such a form. More routine cases
may even be susceptible to a simple check-the-box form for much of the
information that should be included. Even a brief but carefully prepared
explanation of what happened in arbitration, and why, could provide all
the needed information.3 6
VII. CONCLUSION
The Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express 347 case
opens a new era in resolving securities disputes, in which the industry is
freed of legal restraints on using arbitration. The securities industry
faces the choice of using arbitration fairly to escape the expense of litiga-
tion for the long-term gain of all, or using it to escape from the industry's
public duties for the industry's short-term gain. Arbitration may hold
many advantages over litigation, but these do not justify forcing unwill-
ing customers out of court and into an apparently biased forum whose
procedures are inadequate to guarantee the rights assured under securi-
ties laws. The industry must recognize that academic arguments that the
343. For rules of the National Association Securities Dealers that address this concern, see
supra note 228.
344. See Elsen, supra note 246, at 483-84 for a discussion of this problem with recommen-
dations. That author notes the availability of impartial arbitrators is especially a problem
outside large, metropolitan areas, since the local securities-affiliated persons who could be arbi-
trators are likely to know one another. Id at 484.
345. The standard form of the New York Stock Exchange is reproduced in Masucci &
Morris, supra note 265, at 303.
346. Such explanations may also discourage fighting an award in court. A clear, unambigu-
ous, and well-supported award would leave the losing party no grounds for challenge.
347. 109 S. Ct. 1917 (1989).
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system is fair will do nothing for the viability of an arbitration system
perceived as unfair because it fails to act to correct its own image. Arbi-
tration must guarantee speedy justice, and not just speed.
L
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